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Robertson v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau9/5/2000
, but based upon the same evidence introduced at the earlier formal evidentiary hearing. Id. We concluded we had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the second order, because a formal evidentiary hearing had been held on the initial order and the second order was based upon the same evidence introduced in the earlier hearing. Id. at 9. We concluded the Bureau's second order was a formal decision after an evidentiary hearing and was a final appealable order. Id. at 10. Cf., Freezon v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 23, 11, 574 N.W.2d 577 (holding Bureau's informal decision without evidentiary hearing was not appealable order); Lende v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 178, 24, 568 N.W.2d 755 (holding party need not file petition for reconsideration before appealing formal decision).
[ ] Here, the Bureau did not rely upon any new evidence in its second order and all its additional findings and conclusions in that decision were based upon evidence introduced at the formal evidentiary hearing. Under these circumstances, we conclude the Bureau's decision is a final appealable order, and the district court erred in deciding Robertson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
V.
[ ] Although the district court erred in deciding Robertson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court alternatively affirmed the Bureau's decision on the merits, and we therefore consider whether Robertson was entitled to the presumption that his heart attack was suffered in the line of duty.
A.
[ ] Robertson argues the 1995 version of the statute, which requires five years of continuous law enforcement work and successful completion of a physical examination which fails to reveal any evidence of the condition, does not apply to him, because he began working in law enforcement in 1982 when the applicable law required two years of continuous law enforcement work. See fn.1. The Bureau says, in Robertson's first appeal, the district court decided the 1995 version of the statute applied and remanded for further findings on whether Robertson had successfully passed a physical examination before 1986 and whether the Bureau had rebutted the presumption. The Bureau thus argues, because Robertson did not appeal the first district court decision to this Court, the application of the 1995 version of the statute became the law of the case and cannot be challenged in this appeal.
[ ] Generally, the law of the case is defined as "`the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same.'" State v. Burckhard, 1999 ND 64, 7, 592 N.W.2d 523, citing, Tom Beuchler Const. v. City of Williston, 413 N.W.2d 336, 339 (N.D. 1987). The law of the case doctrine is grounded on judicial economy to prevent piecemeal and unnecessary appeals. See Beuchler, at 338-39. The doctrine encompasses not only issues decided in a first appeal, but also issues which were not presented for review in the first appeal. Beuchler, at 339. In another context, however, we have declined to hear appeals where subsequent proceedings could obviate the need for appellate review. See, e.g., Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co. Inc., 503 N.W.2d 240, 241-42 (N.D. 1993) (applying N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b)).
[ ] Here, Robertson has raised this issue throughout this proceeding. Cf., Siewert v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 33, 33, 606 N.W.2d 501 (holding question of law not raised in prior appeal would not be examined in s
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