Doyle v. Department Of Industrial Accidents9/7/2000
For purposes of reviewing whether a complaint was properly dismissed, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and inquire whether it appears certain that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any facts which could be proven in support of his claim. See Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977); Fairneny v. Savogran Co., 422 Mass. 469, 470 (1996).
Doyle does not dispute that, where an aggrieved party wishes to appeal a decision of an administrative agency, relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to G. L. c. 249, Sect. 4, is the appropriate remedy. See McLellan v. Commissioner of Correction, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 933, 934 (1990). Accordingly, if we conclude that Doyle's complaint is in fact in the nature of certiorari, it follows that it was filed too late and was correctly dismissed. Doyle, however, contends that declaratory relief, rather than relief in the nature of certiorari, is the appropriate remedy because the claims he raises concern the constitutionality of the procedures used by the DIA when adjudicating claims regarding vocational rehabilitation benefits. " complaint for declaratory relief is an appropriate way of testing the validity of regulations or the propriety of practices involving violations of rights, which are consistent and repeated in nature." Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388 n.12 (1983). Hence, Doyle argues, his claim was improperly dismissed.
"To secure declaratory relief in a case involving administrative action, a plaintiff must show that (1) there is an actual controversy; (2) he has standing; (3) necessary parties have been joined; and (4) available administrative remedies have been exhausted." Villages Dev. Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 410 Mass. 100, 106 (1991). In order to demonstrate standing, the plaintiff must allege a legally cognizable injury. See Massachusetts Assn. of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977); Villages Dev. Co. v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 410 Mass. at 106.
Doyle alleges that he was deprived of his right to vocational rehabilitation benefits without due process of law. " here the plaintiffs claim that a denial of procedural due process deprived them of property, they must show first that the property interest that they claim was one to which they had an entitlement." Liability Investigative Fund Effort, Inc. v. Massachusetts Med. Professional Ins. Assn., 418 Mass. 436, 443, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1058 (1994). Thus, Doyle's claim rests upon whether he had an entitlement to vocational rehabilitation benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 152, Sect. 30H.
Doyle raises his due process claims under both the Federal Constitution and art. 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; the procedural protections under the two are co-extensive. See School Comm. of Hatfield v. Board of Educ., 372 Mass. 513, 515 n.2 (1977); Liability Investigative Fund Effort, Inc. v. Massachusetts Med. Professional Ins. Assn., supra at 443. Property interests are not created by either the State or Federal Constitution; they are instead "created and their dimensions . . . defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 368 Mass. 15, 23, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975), quoting from Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See Allen v. Assessors of Granby, 387 Mass. 117, 119 (1982); Madera v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Communities & Dev., 418 Mass. 452, 459 (1994).
"To have a property inte
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