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Day v. City of Middletown9/12/2000
The law firm of Furniss and Quinn, P.C. (firm), a de facto party in this case, appeals from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) reducing the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the firm from $30,000 to $20,000. The firm claims that the board improperly substituted its judgment for that of the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) in setting the attorney's fees. We affirm the decision of the board.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On September 27, 1993, the plaintiff, James Day, retained the firm to represent him in the prosecution of a workers' compensation action. The plaintiff agreed to pay the firm attorney's fees of 20 percent of his gross recovery, subject to the commissioner's approval. The firm represented the plaintiff for almost two years. During that time, the firm obtained documents from the plaintiff's physician, attended numerous informal conferences and four formal evidentiary hearings, and participated in the deposition of four medical witnesses.
On March 7, 1995, following the conclusion of the evidence in the formal proceedings, the plaintiff discharged the firm as counsel and retained attorney Kenneth Bartlett in its place. On September 21, 1995, the plaintiff agreed to a lump sum settlement in the amount of $100,000. Formal hearings were subsequently held to determine the amount of attorney's fees owed to the firm and to Bartlett. On February 2, 1996, the commissioner awarded the firm $30,000 in attorney's fees.
The plaintiff appealed to the board from the commissioner's award of attorney's fees. The board reversed the commissioner's decision and reduced the award of attorney's fees from $30,000 to $20,000. The board held that (1) the $30,000 award was contrary to the workers' compensation fee guidelines (fee guidelines) promulgated by the chairman of the workers' compensation commission pursuant to General Statutes § 31-280 (b) (11) (C), and (2) the plaintiff's attorney's fee agreement entitled the firm to only $20,000. This appeal followed.
The firm first claims that the board improperly reduced its award of attorney's fees from $30,000 to $20,000 because such a determination is within the sole discretion of the commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 31-327 (b). We disagree.
"As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals. . . . It is well established that lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board. . . . A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny. . . . Duni v. United Technologies Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 24-25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996); Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). Where . . . [a workers' compensation] appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 603-604, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).
The firm argues that the commissioner's authority with respect to attorney's fees derives from § 31-327 (b), which provides in relevant part that "all fees of attorneys . . . shall be subject to the approval of the commissioner." We agree with the board's conclusion that § 31-327 (b) only "gives the [commissioner] the power to examine all attorney's fee agreements to ensure that they are consistent with the fee guidelines . . . ." General Statu
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