Mead v. Holzman8/29/2000
mann because the schedule of basic child support obligations, consulted by the trial court after calculation of the parties' adjusted gross incomes in order to arrive at the parties' combined child support obligation, considers the impact of income taxes. See Guidelines, §§ 4(h), 7. Thus, argues Mead, unless tax is imputed to Holzmann, he will receive a "windfall" as taxes are not deducted from his disability income.
Holzmann counters that section 4(a) does not, on its face, require an imputation of taxes to account for non-taxable disability benefits and imposing such a requirement would unnecessarily complicate the calculation of gross income. According to Holzmann, any adjustments to a child support calculation must be made pursuant to section 17 of the Guidelines, which mandates deviation from the Guidelines under specified circumstances. He argues that deviation under that section was not warranted in this case.
In interpreting the Guidelines, we apply the same rules of construction as are used in construing statutes. See State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. McEvoy, 191 Ariz. 350, 353, 13, n.4, 955 P.2d 988, 991 (App. 1998). Thus, to determine the supreme court's intent under section 4(a) of the Guidelines, we look first to its language. See Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 176 Ariz. 190, 193, 859 P.2d 1323, 1326 (1993). We further interpret section 4(a) in conjunction with other provisions of the Guidelines, see Goulder v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414, 416, 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App. 1993), and in light of the Guidelines' overall purpose. See Bryan v. Riddel, 178 Ariz. 472, 477, 875 P.2d 131, 136 (1994).
We disagree with Mead that the non-limitation language contained in section 4(a) means the trial court must impute a pre- tax income to a party, like Holzmann, who receives non-taxable income. The plain meaning of the words in section 4(a) simply allows the trial court to consider other sources of income for purposes of determining gross income. See Parada v. Parada, No. CV-97-0520-PR, 2000 WL 419818, at *4, 14 (Ariz. Apr. 19, 2000) ("'Statutory construction applies generally accepted meanings to challenged words or terms.'") (citation omitted). Avoidance of taxation is not a source of income, but is, instead, a cost savings. Moreover, section 4 specifically notes that 'gross income,' as used in the Guidelines, "do not have the same meaning as when [it is] used for tax purposes." Thus, mere use of the term 'gross income' fails to evidence an intent by the supreme court that non-taxation of certain income should be accounted for in the calculation.
Mead's argument is further undercut by reference to other provisions of the Guidelines. See Goulder, 177 Ariz. at 416, 868 P.2d at 999. Section 4(a) states that " easonal or fluctuating income shall be annualized." Section 4(e) specifically allows the court to impute income and expenses to a non-working or partially employed parent under certain circumstances. Section 5 provides for adjustments to gross income calculated under section 4(a) if a party pays spousal maintenance and support for other children. By contrast, section 4(a) is silent regarding imputation of a pre-tax income to parents who receive non-taxable disability benefits, even though such benefits are listed as sources of income. In light of the supreme court's specification of situations in which gross income can be imputed or adjusted, its failure to provide for imputation of a pre-tax income to recipients of disability benefits further supports a conclusion that such tax avoidance is not intended to be "other income" under section 4(a). See Arizona Bd. of Regents v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety
Page 1 2 3 4 Arizona Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|