Aranda v. Industrial Commission of Arizona9/12/2000
In the instant cases, both claimants filed for workers' compensation benefits and received awards which became final prior to the enactment of section 23-1031. An award substantiates a legal obligation for payment, upon which the worker and the carrier have a right to rely. If a carrier withholds or reduces payment, the claimant may exercise an existing, legal right to enforce compliance with the award by direct action against the carrier for payment and, if relevant, bad faith. See Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 275, 872 P.2d 668, 679 (1994).
Where every necessary event has occurred making implementation of the right a certainty, then the right to receive a workers' compensation benefit constitutes a substantive vested property right. This means that when final, the award creates an immediate right to present enjoyment of benefits in the current month, as well as future enjoyment in subsequent months. Such rights are neither contingent nor merely expectant.
Steinfeld v. Nielsen defined vested rights as those that are neither contingent nor expectant:
'Rights are vested, in contradistinction to being expectant or contingent. They are vested, when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. They are expectant, when they depend upon the continued existence of the present condition of things until the happening of some future event. They are contingent, when they are only to come into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their vesting.' 15 Ariz. 424, 465, 139 P. 879, 895 (1913) (quoting Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646, 673, 16 S. Ct. 705, 713 (1896)). Here, the award leaves nothing to contingency or to some future event.
In the instant cases, it may be said that vesting occurs, at the latest, upon finalization of the award. See Pima County Bd., 149 Ariz. at 43, 716 P.2d at 412 ("After findings and an award are made, the doctrine of res judicata operates to bar relitigation of issues which were or could have been decided at that proceeding."). Aranda's award became final August 23, 1996, and Everett's became final January 24, 1994. Section 23-1031 did not become effective until December 1, 1997.
The State Fund asserts that A.R.S. section 23-1044(F) merely rearranges benefits, thereby making the right contingent or expectant, rather than vested. However, in Gallo, dealing with the Commission's authority to reduce benefits after a final award of permanent partial disability, this court determined that the 1953 amendment to A.R.S. section 56-957 (now A.R.S. section 23-1044(F)) could not be retroactively applied because "the amendment affects vested rights and is substantive legislation." Gallo, 83 Ariz. at 396, 322 P.2d at 375. Thus, at least as far back as 1958, this court has viewed permanent partial disability benefits as vested rights and limited "the jurisdiction of the Commission to alter, amend, or rescind awards for unscheduled permanent partial disabilities" to its authority under the statutes existing at the time of injury and award. Id.
We stated in Tower Plaza Inv. Ltd. v. DeWitt, 109 Ariz. 248, 508 P.2d 324 (1973), that "a statute is not retroactive in application simply because it may relate to antecedent facts." Tower, 109 Ariz. at 250, 508 P.2d at 326; see also Hall, 149 Ariz. at 139, 717 P.2d at 443. In Tower, the petitioners were owners of real property who had entered into written leases. After the leasing contracts were complete, the Arizona Legislature passed a tax statute which acted as an excise tax on the privilege of doing business as a lessor.
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