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Hoffman v. Greenup9/13/2000
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
AFFIRMED
On April 7, 1997, appellant, Jo Ann Hoffman, received a speeding ticket from Deputy Maurice Helms. Appellee Carmen Greenup was appointed by Municipal Court Judge John Skaggs to represent her. At trial held January 28, 1998, appellant admitted speeding, but defended by alleging that she was cognitively impaired. In response to questioning by the judge, however, she denied that she was impaired at the time she was ticketed. Appellant was found guilty of speeding. She then filed a motion for new trial which was denied.
On January 29, 1999, appellant filed a pro se complaint and supplemental complaint against Greenup, prosecuting attorney Jason Kelley, and Deputy Helms, alleging violation of her civil and criminal rights and the code of professional conduct. All defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions for dismissal or summary judgment and motions for Rule 11 sanctions. After a hearing held March 8, 1999, Judge Keith dismissed appellant's complaints for failure to state facts upon which relief could be granted and ruled that appellant would not be allowed to file further pleadings without consent of the court. Appellant appeals from the March 8, 1999, order.
Appellant's arguments on appeal are difficult to comprehend - she has failed to follow Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(7)'s requirement that arguments shall correspond to the outline of points on appeal and has included irrelevant material in the abstract in contravention of Rule 4-2(a)(6). Additionally, her argument deals only with facts, not law. The fact that appellant is pro se is of no consequence. A party appearing pro se is responsible for any mistakes he makes and receives no special consideration on appeal. Brown v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 339 Ark. 458, 6 S.W.3d 102 (1999).
Appellant also has a fundamental misunderstanding of the type of order entered by the circuit judge. She argues that he erred in granting summary judgment to appellees. He did not, however, grant summary judgment; his order dismissed her claims on the basis of Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint "for failure to state facts upon which relief can be granted." In reviewing a dismissal granted pursuant to that rule, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. King v. Whitfield, 339 Ark. 176, 5 S.W.3d 21 (1999). Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) states that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain a statement in ordinary and concise language of facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. These two rules must be read together in testing the sufficiency of the complaint; facts, not mere conclusions, must be alleged. Wilson v. Adkins, 57 Ark. App. 43, 941 S.W.2d 440 (1997). The facts constituting the cause of action must be pled in direct and positive allegations, not by way of argument, inference, or belief; statements of generalities are not sufficient to state a cause of action. Big A Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Rye Auto Supply, Inc., 19 Ark. App. 286, 719 S.W.2d 716 (1986).
Appellant's arguments on appeal, as we understand them, are that appellees violated the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, and that the circuit judge should have recused. To the extent that we understand appellant's arguments, we believe the circuit judge's decision should be affirmed in all respects.
Appellant's only citations of authority are bare assertions, without further explanation of h
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