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Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance2/20/2001
r his representative, the employer shall acknowledge receipt of the report in writing either upon the report or a copy of the report.
(c) Failure of the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to report the accident or injury to the employer and to file the injury report in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is a presumption that the claim shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted if the employee establishes by clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in investigating the injury and in monitoring medical treatment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. ยง 27-14-502 (LEXIS 1999); 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 82, Sec. 1.
[ ] As Wesaw points out, primarily these amendments have substituted the term "injury" for "accident" and, in his view, do not require a report until an injury has been correctly diagnosed by a doctor. Plainly, the statutory amendments do not state that. Our rules of statutory interpretation are well-established:
We decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. In effectuating the plain language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia. If, on the other hand, we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. In Re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Wyo. Dept. of Transportation v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo. 1999)).
[ ] The statute at issue here is subject to only one interpretation and is not ambiguous. Furthermore, the statutory language "after the general nature of the injury became apparent" remains unchanged, and these amendments do not replace our previous decisions applying the statute's requirements from the date a compensable injury is discovered. We do find, however, that the plain language of subsection (c) indicates that the statutory presumption does not arise unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an injury report within ten days. Here, the employer raised only the issue whether Wesaw reported within ten days. Unmistakably, this contention is insufficient to raise the statutory presumption of claim denial. Although this determination is sufficient to require reversal and remand for a hearing on the merits, the Division's position that it would have presented evidence that no report to the employer was made at all causes us to presume that both timeliness contentions will be made and the statutory presumption of denial will again arise. We must, therefore, apply the rules of law previously discussed to determine the date of compensable injury.
[ ] At the close of Wesaw's case, the hearing examiner requested argument from the Division and employer about when the injury became apparent. Both argued that Wesaw, by testifying that liquid splashed on his face and caused a burning sensation, coughing, and a red face, had testified that the injury was apparent to him on October 15, 1998. Wesaw, however, was not claiming to have been burned. Wesaw seeks compensation for an inhalation injury. The only symptom that he experienced indicating an inhalation injury on October 15, 1998, was a sore throat which he did not believe was serious. As more symptoms appeared, Wesaw attributed his worsening illness to a
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