 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Schmitt v. Schmitt2/8/2001
the parties had different standards of living during their marriage.
. Arnold next contends that the trial court erred by "fail to apply standard statutory factors to this case, instead it discounted the length of the marriage due to the fact that the parties did not sleep with each other in the same bedroom." We conclude that the trial court did not fail to apply the statutory factors in this case.
. The court explicitly referred to Wis. Stat. § 767.26, and it expressly considered the statutory factors: (1) length of marriage: 38 years; (2) age and physical and emotional health of parties: comparable; (3) division of property: parties agreed to equal distribution; (4) educational level of each party: comparable (high school); (5) earning capacity of party seeking maintenance: slightly underemployed; (6) feasibility that party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting at standard of living reasonably comparable to standard enjoyed during marriage: they lived separate lives, different lifestyles during the marriage; (7) tax consequences: Kathleen would pay taxes on any property division equalization out of her funds; (8) contribution of one to education, training or increased earning power of other: "There wasn't a significant amount of that done here."; (9) mutual agreements made before or during marriage: none, except in action; (10) other factors as the court deems relevant in individual case: the trial court discounted the length of the marriage because they "lived basically separate lives for at least ... 15 years." The court weighted the last factor as the most significant.
. Based on Kathleen's testimony, the trial court found that she and Arnold lived separate lives for several years prior to the divorce action at issue. We will not disturb this finding of fact because it is not clearly erroneous, that is, against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2); Siker v. Siker, 225 Wis. 2d 522, 527-28, 593 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1999). Arnold points to evidence that they had not lived separate lives because they lived under one roof and shared expenses. However, there was also evidence, as explained above, that they led very separate and quite different lives. It is not accurate to say that the trial court simply discounted the length of the marriage because the parties did not sleep with each other in the same bedroom. In fact, the court did not mention that fact in rendering its decision. The court's focus was on the parties' separate finances and the apparent lack of any contribution by Arnold to Kathleen's earning capacity.
. Arnold objects strongly to the "living separate lives" evidence, claiming it is not relevant because "it is not a statutory factor under Wis. Stat. § 767.26." While not one of the specifically enumerated statutory factors, the court considered it under the broad catchall provision of Wis. Stat. § 767.26(10) (other factors as the court deems relevant). It was not impermissible for the court to consider the current and long-standing living arrangements and lifestyles of the parties. Indeed, the court's award appears to implement what the parties had already agreed to in practice during their marriage. "Under subsection (10) a circuit court may consider ` uch other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.' This broad `catchall' provision exemplifies the flexibility that a circuit court has in crafting a fair and equitable remedy." Meyer v. Meyer, 2000 WI 132, , 239 Wis. 2d 731, 620 N.W.2d 382 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). Moreover, " ound discretion in maintenance determinations must reflect consideration of the factors set out in Wis. Stat. § 767.26, but the factors in t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Wisconsin Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|