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Boyd v. Home Health First2/2/2001
Justice Whittington
Gloria Boyd appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Home Health First (HHF) and Visiting Nurse Association (VNA). In a single issue, Boyd claims the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment because fact issues exist. We reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.
Background
Boyd injured her lower back on July 29, 1996 while attempting to lift a patient into a wheelchair at the patient's home. She reported her injury and was given a "light-duty" assignment. Several months later, in a letter dated December 9, 1996, Boyd was informed that her employer would "no longer be able to provide modified duty as a means of employment." The letter stated she could consult "Human Resources or supervisor about additional job opportunities within Home Health First or any of member organizations." Boyd did not inquire about other positions within HHF and was subsequently terminated.
On December 9, 1998, Boyd sued HHF and VNA. In her petition, she alleged she was employed by both HHF and VNA and that she was terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim. HHF and VNA filed an answer, generally denying Boyd's claims. In addition, VNA denied being liable in the capacity in which it was sued. HHF and VNA then filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging each was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (i) VNA was not Boyd's employer and (ii) HHF did not terminate Boyd for filing a workers' compensation claim. The trial judge agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of VNA and HHF. This appeal followed.
Summary Judgment Standard
The standards for reviewing summary judgment under rule 166a(c) are well established. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985); Orozco v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App._Dallas 1998, no pet.). To prevail on summary judgment, the defendants must either disprove at least one element of each of the plaintiff's theories of recovery or plead and conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause of action. International Union United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 119 v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. App._Dallas 1991, writ denied). A matter is conclusively established if ordinary minds could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982). Once the defendants establish their right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff must present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979); Muckelroy v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 884 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. App._Dallas 1994, writ denied).
Employment
Boyd first contends the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment because fact issues exist regarding whether Boyd was employed by VNA. Although HHF and VNA both claim Boyd was employed only by HHF on the date of her injury and thereafter, Boyd claims her summary judgment evidence creates a fact issue, thereby precluding summary judgment. We agree with Boyd.
HHF and VNA filed a joint motion for summary judgment in which they alleged that, on the date of her injury, Boyd worked for HHF, not VNA. To support this claim, they attached the affidavit of Don Richardson, a VNA vice-president. Richardson testified that although Boyd had worked for VNA before July 1, 1996, after that date, (i) Boyd was not employed by and did n
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