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Perkins v. Sanderson Farms2/8/2001
Appellant, Kevin Perkins, sued appellee, Sanderson Farms, Inc., for wrongful termination. Perkins contends the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in Sanderson Farms' favor. We review whether Perkins was terminated for a discriminatory reason. We affirm.
Facts
Perkins was a mechanic for Sanderson Farms when he was injured on the job in March 1997. Perkins reported his injuries to Jeff Neblitt, his supervisor. Perkins continued to work after his injury despite complaining of headaches and soreness. In June 1997, Perkins was placed on leave by his physician, Dr. David N. Bailey, so that he could adequately recover from his injury. On July 7, 1997, Perkins signed a "request for leave of absence" indicating that he had received: (1) a Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) form that was to be completed by his doctor; and (2) notice of Sanderson Farms' policy on FMLA leave. Dr. Bailey sent Perkins's progress reports ("Doctor's Work Status Reports") to Sanderson Farms approximately every two weeks from June 1997 through March 26, 1998.
On March 26, 1998, Perkins notified Sanderson Farms that he was able to return to work. Sanderson Farms informed Perkins he had been terminated on December 10, 1997 because he had violated its FMLA policy. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1999). Specifically, Sanderson Farms maintains that Perkins's 12-week FMLA leave lasted from June 9, 1997 through September 8, 1997, and was extended until December 10, 1997. Sanderson Farms stated it terminated Perkins because: (1) he had failed to inform Sanderson Farms of his medical condition; and (2) he had not sought an extension of his FMLA leave.
The record contains no evidence that Sanderson Farms informed appellant of his termination until March 26, 1998. Perkins filed suit, alleging Sanderson Farms wrongfully terminated him in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Sanderson Farms moved for a no- evidence summary judgment, arguing it terminated Perkins because he violated the company's absence-control policy by not returning to work before his FMLA leave expired. The trial court granted Sanderson Farms' motion.
Standard of Review
We review the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. See Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A no- evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the non-movant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Greathouse v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 17 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
Retaliation
Perkins presents two issues, which we construe as a single argument challenging the summary judgment rendered in Sanderson Farms' favor. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), 38.9. Perkins contends Sanderson Farms used the FMLA as a neutral absence control policy to terminate him in retaliation for his filing a workers' compensation claim. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 451.001 (Vernon 1996). Perkins argues there is enough evidence to raise a fact issue that Sanderson Farms terminated him for a discriminatory reason.
An employee asserting a violation of section 451.001 has the initial burden of demonstrating a causal link between the discharge and the filing of the claim for workers' compensation benefits. Terry v. Southern Floral Co., 927 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). The burden then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the dis
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