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Snyder v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau2/20/2001
§ 65-05-08 "does not even specifically address those claimants who are on permanent and total disability . . . . The statute clearly addresses temporary disability." The statute does not distinguish between permanent or temporary disability. It addresses all recipients of disability benefits by referring only to "disability," which N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(15) defines as "loss of earnings capacity and may be permanent total, temporary total, or partial."
IV.
[ ] Snyder contends the Bureau did not afford him procedural due process before terminating his benefits. Snyder argues:
The first manner in which the procedure is deficient is the usage of the RTW cards for injured workers who have reached retirement age and whose benefits have been "transformed" from temporary status to a recognition that they will not meaningfully re-enter the work force.
We have already concluded the reporting requirement of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(3) applies to Snyder. Thus, we conclude the Bureau did not deny Snyder procedural due process by sending him forms for reporting work activities and income.
[ ] Snyder argues a second manner in which the Bureau's procedure was deficient "is the cards themselves. The RTW cards do not anywhere define or put the claimants on notice of what the Bureau will consider `work'." Section 65-05-08(3), N.D.C.C., requires a recipient of disability or rehabilitation benefits to "report any work activities to the bureau whether or not the injured employee receives any wages." Neither the legislature nor the Bureau has defined "work" for purposes of the reporting requirement of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(3). We recently said:
The lack of either a statutory or administrative-rule definition of "work" leaves the issue of whether certain activity is "work" to an after-the-fact determination. To the extent this may seem to give inadequate notice of what the Bureau considers "work," words not defined in a statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. This means not only that the Bureau may not agree with the claimant but, without a definition in the statute or a rule, the Bureau takes the risk the courts will not agree with the Bureau's application of the term to particular facts. Jacobson, 2000 ND 225, 15 n.1. Snyder opened the Midtowner Restaurant at 5:00 a.m. daily and stayed until 7:00 a.m., baked rolls, turned on the grill, made coffee, signed receipts for deliveries, cooked and served meals to customers, collected money at the cash register, picked up supplies, and performed maintenance work, for which he received cash payments of $80 per month and food worth $30-60 per month. We conclude, as a matter of law, Snyder's restaurant activities constitute "work" in its ordinary sense.
[ ] Snyder argues his activities at the restaurant were "for his benefit as therapy or self-care," and not "work," which N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(3) provides "does not include routine daily activities of self-care." The term "self-care" has not been defined for purposes of workers compensation benefits. While Snyder's restaurant activities may be therapeutic for him, they, nevertheless, constitute work, and we are not persuaded they fall within the exception for "self-care."
V.
[ ] Snyder contends the Bureau did not meet its burden of proving he willfully made false statements in violation of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-33, which provides, in part:
. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if that person is claiming benefits or payment for services under this title, and that person:
. Willfully files a false claim or makes a false statement.
. Has a claim for disability
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