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McCallum v. North Carolina Cooperative Extension Service of N.C.2/6/2001
71). As the federal court has already conclusively ruled against plaintiff upon the issue of discriminatory intent by defendants, collateral estoppel prevents the plaintiff from proceeding on this claim.
Plaintiff also alleges a claim against defendants for retaliatory discharge. During his employment with NCCES, plaintiff was President of the North Carolina Association of Extension Minorities (NCAEM), a group organized to promote African-American interests within the extension agency. Plaintiff asserts that in his capacity as President, he often "spoke out on matters of public concern regarding trends and activities within the Extension Service that were adverse to the interests of African American extension agents and farmers." Plaintiff argues that defendants fired him for his NCAEM leadership, thus violating his constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and association.
In challenging an adverse employment decision for violation of constitutional rights, an employee must show that the "protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision." Lenzer v. Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 509, 418 S.E.2d 276, 284, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345, 421 S.E.2d 348 (1992). Although evidence of retaliation may often be completely circumstantial, the causal connection between the protected activity and the discharge "must be something more than speculation." Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 237, 382 S.E.2d 874, 882, disc. review denied, 325 N.C. 704, 388 S.E.2d 449 (1989).
In the instant case, plaintiff argued in the federal court that his membership in NCAEM, among other things, triggered defendants' decision to fire him. The federal court found no evidence, direct or indirect, to support plaintiff's claim, stating that " o reasonable jury could find that McCallum's activities with the NCAEM . . . were a 'motivating part' of his termination . . . ." Thus, the federal court ruled against plaintiff on the exact issue that plaintiff now raises in state court. Plaintiff is therefore collaterally estopped from seeking a state court resolution on the issue of a causal connection between plaintiff's constitutionally protected activities and the adverse employment action taken by defendants. Because the lack of a causal connection is fatal to plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
The issues of defendants' discriminatory intent and improper motivation were tried in the federal court after full discovery; resolution of those issues were material and necessary to the judgment in that court. The doctrine of collateral estoppel therefore bars the re-litigation of these issues in our state trial courts. Because plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, succeed on his claims, the trial court erred when it refused to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination, equal protection violations, and retaliatory discharge.
II. Due Process
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that his right to due process as guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution was violated. Defendants contend that plaintiff is an at-will employee and is, therefore, not entitled to a property right in his employment that would support a claim for due process violations. Alternatively, defendants argue that, if plaintiff is not an at-will employee, he has statutory remedies under the State Personnel Act which he must first exhaust before seeking constitutional reparations.
In North Carolina, both private and public employees may be classified as "at-will" employees. An em
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