 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Oliver v. State Tax Commission2/13/2001
Missouri-Kansas City that denied access to public facilities at a state university for a religious group that wished to conduct meetings, which included religious worship and religious teaching. In support of the university's regulation, the state cited a "compelling interest in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution" quoted above. Id. The Supreme Court found it "unnecessary . . . to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, a state interest, derived from its own constitution could ever outweigh free speech interest protected by the First Amendment." The Court went on to hold that the university's regulation violated the principle that such regulation must be "content-neutral." Id. at 275-76.
In Widmar there unquestionably was the use of state facilities by a religious organization, which might violate a literal reading of the first clause of article I, section 7, of the Missouri Constitution. But the overriding requirement of the federal constitution is that the religious organization not be discriminated against on the basis of the content of its activities, and in this case the Missouri Constitution is consistent with this principle.
State activities and religious beliefs will occasionally intersect, and references to God are found in many of our governmental activities. Rather than being able to cleanse our institutions of any religious suggestion or content, or to purge any incidental support that religious adherents might receive on a nondiscriminatory basis, the best that can be achieved in the context of this case is strict neutrality of the state as to those who express a belief in God and those who do not. The resolution reached here achieves that neutrality, and the reference to God in the statute is permissible.
The Equal Protection Argument
Oliver and the Freedom from Religion Foundation also argue that section 137.155 violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Missouri constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 2. They argue that section 137.155 imposes on Oliver and other residents of second through fourth class counties a requirement not imposed on residents of first class counties whose property tax certifications do not refer to God. See section 137.360.
There is no equal protection violation here because the state is free to choose different forms of regulation in different classifications of counties, so long as there is no underlying discrimination against particular persons or groups that lacks a rational basis. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). The equal protection guarantee is not violated provided that all persons within the territorial reach of a specific statute are equally affected by the law; "it matters not that those outside the territorial reach of the law are free to behave differently." Reeder v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 796 F.2d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 1986).
Both section 137.155 and section 137.360 allow for non-religious attestations, an "affirmation," as in section 137.155, or a "certification," as in section 137.360. There is no substantive difference between these two terms.
However, Oliver asserts that he and other nonbelievers are still being treated differently because they would have to identify themselves as "nontheist" in order to obtain any accommodation, a requirement not necessary for first class county residents.
There is no requirement that a taxpayer proclaim that he or she is a "nontheist," an atheist, or that he or she simply does not believe it is appropriate to the person's beliefs to swear before civil authorities. As the statute allows a taxpayer to "swear" or "
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Missouri Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|