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Redfield v. Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services1/30/2001
I really didn't have any input. He handled everything for me.
Q. When you were sitting there in the courtroom and they were asking these questions did this incident in the Bi-State bus and this lawsuit did that enter into your mind?
A. No, it didn't.
Q. It did not?
A. No.
We find that Hopper's nondisclosure was both unintentional and reasonable, in light of her testimony at the post-trial hearing that she did not recall the incident during voir dire as well as the fact that the incident occurred five years prior to the instant proceeding, and Hopper received a nominal amount of money in settlement after the proceedings concluded.
Where nondisclosure is found to be both unintentional and reasonable, the relevant inquiry becomes whether the juror's presence did influence the verdict or may have influenced the verdict so as to prejudice the party seeking a new trial. Rogers v. Bond, 880 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). One of the factors for consideration is the materiality and relevance of the undisclosed experience. Id. As the similarity between the undisclosed experience and the case at hand increases, so does the inference of bias and prejudice, the impairment of counsel's ability to make informed peremptory challenges, and the incredulity of the juror's purported forgetfulness. Id.
We find that Hopper's undisclosed experience was immaterial. Hopper's failure to disclose a Bi-State bus accident injury is dissimilar to a lawsuit involving wrongful death due to a defective ventilator and negligence in providing healthcare. Accordingly, Hopper's presence did not influence the verdict so as to prejudice Aequitron and Beverly.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court's conclusion that Hopper had not forgotten the Bi-State incident and that Hopper's nondisclosure was unreasonable to be an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Appellant's point on appeal is granted. The trial court's judgment granting the Motions of Aequitron and Beverly for New Trial based on intentional nondisclosure of Hopper is reversed.
Aequitron presents five points on cross-appeal. An initial matter that needs to be addressed is the jurisdiction of this Court to hear Aequitron's points on cross-appeal. Although the trial court's judgment granting a new trial removed any adverse judgment that might have aggrieved Aequitron, Community Title Co. v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 796 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Mo.banc 1990), we now reverse the trial court's judgment granting a new trial, and Aequitron is ostensibly aggrieved. Thus we now address Aequitron's points on cross-appeal.
Aequitron's first point on cross-appeal contends that the trial court should have granted it a new trial because there was no substantial evidence to establish that the ventilator was defective or that there was a causal relationship between the alleged defects in the ventilator and Jones's death in that: (1) there was no substantial evidence that the alleged susceptibility to electromagnetic interference (EMI) or the age and complexity of the microprocessor rendered the ventilator defective or unreasonably dangerous or caused it to fail; and (2) there was no substantial evidence that an independent backup system or an independent robotic monitoring system would have prevented Jones's death. Aequitron maintains that a new trial is required if we find that Appellant failed to establish sufficient evidence to support either of these theories because it is impossible to determine which theory the jury relied on when it found in Appellant's favor. See Saupe v. Kertz, 523 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Mo.banc 1975).
In determining whe
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