Chambers v. Trettco2/16/2001
FOR PUBLICATION
9:05 a.m.
ON REMAND
This case returns to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court. Because the facts are set forth in detail in our earlier opinion, Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 232 Mich App 560, 562-564; 591 NW2d 413 (1998) (Chambers I), and in the Supreme Court's decision, Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 303-306; 614 NW2d 910 (2000) (Chambers II), we will repeat them here only as necessary to bring the issues into focus.
Plaintiff brought a claim of sexual harassment against defendant, her employer, under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., alleging both quid-pro-quo and hostile-workplace harassment. The jury accepted both theories and awarded damages. A divided panel of this Court, relying heavily on recent federal cases construing Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e et seq., affirmed. Our Supreme Court in turn held that this Court's reliance on the federal case law was misplaced, Chambers II, supra at 313- 316, dismissed plaintiff's quid-pro-quo claim, and remanded the case to this Court for resolution of the hostile-environment claim in accordance with Michigan precedents. Id. at 326. We reverse.
Plaintiff alleged that a temporary supervisor, assigned to her work station for four days while her regular supervisor was on vacation, engaged in a pattern of seriously suggestive and offensive behavior, and did so over plaintiff's clear objections. Plaintiff complained to co-workers about wishing to leave her job, but she did not initiate the proceedings for sexual harassment complaints set forth in defendant's employee handbook. However, plaintiff happened to answer the phone when defendant's regional director of operations telephoned. The latter sensed that something was wrong, but plaintiff chose not to explain the problem, apparently because the offender was nearby. The director indicated that he would talk to plaintiff later, but no meeting between plaintiff and the director followed. Plaintiff did complain to her regular supervisor when the latter returned from vacation. The record does not indicate what action, if any, defendant took against the offender in response, but the offender never confronted plaintiff at work again.
Section 202 of our Civil Rights Act provides that an employer may not "discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, . . . because of . . . sex, . . . or marital status." Section 103(i) clarifies that " iscrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment," which the subsection defines as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature," under certain circumstances. Qualifying circumstances include, under subsection (i)(ii), where the employee's submission to or rejection of sexual overtures "is used as a factor in decisions affecting such individual's employment . . . ," and, under subsection (i)(iii), where " he conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment, . . . or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment."
Our statute thus expressly recognizes sexual harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination, and carefully distinguishes between what are commonly labeled "quid-pro-quo" and "hostile-environment" harassment. The federal Civil Rights Act does neither, but merely prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Chambers II, supra at 315, citing 42 USC 2000e- 2(a)(1). Further, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that, under the federal Civil Rights Act, once a plaintiff has e
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