Cust v. University of Maine2/9/2001
to the law at the time of each injury. Id.
Cust contends that it is implicit in subsection 201(6)'s requirement that one injury must precede January 1, 1993, that the other injury must occur after January 1, 1993. We disagree. We have consistently applied the implementing statute of Title 39-A, § A-10, to determine whether a provision of the Act applies retroactively to pre-1993 injuries. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Maine Med. Ctr., 675 A.2d 110, 111 (Me. 1996); Curtis v. Nat'l Sea Prods., 657 A.2d 320, 321, n.2 (Me. 1995); Baker v. Klein, 655 A.2d 367, 368, n.2 (Me. 1995); Morgan-Leland v. Univ. of Maine, 632 A.2d 748, 748-49 (Me. 1993). Section A-10 provides:
This Part applies to all matters in which an injury occurs on or after January 1, 1993. So as not to alter benefits for injuries incurred before January 1, 1993, for matters in which the injury occurred prior to that date, all provisions of this Act apply, except that Maine Revised Statutes Title 39-A, sections 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 306, and 325 do not apply. With regard to matters in which the injury occurred prior to January 1, 1993 the applicable provisions of the former Title 39 apply in place of Title 39-A, sections 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 306, and 325. . . . P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-10 (effective January 1, 1993).
Because section 201 is not listed in section A-10 as having purely prospective effect, section 201 may be applied to injuries preceding the effective date of title 39-A. As we have stated, " clearer statement of legislative intent . . . is hard to imagine." Morgan-Leland, 632 A.2d at 749.
The purpose of subsection 201(6) was to preserve the law in effect at the time of the injury for injuries occurring prior to the effective date of title 39-A. See L.D. 1318, Statement of Fact (118th Legis. 1998). By its express language, subsection 201(6) is applicable when an injury "aggravates, accelerates or combines with the effects of a work-related injury that occurred prior to January 1, 1993 . . . ." 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(6). The plain language places no limitation on the date of the subsequent injury.
Moreover, even if we were to agree that subsection 201(6) is inapplicable, it would be unavailing to the employee. Subsection 201(6) was enacted in 1998 with the purpose of changing the rule of law established in Ray v. Carland Constr., Inc., 1997 ME 206, 6, 703 A.2d 648, 650-51. In Ray, 1997 ME 206, 5-6, 703 A.2d at 650, we relied on an earlier decision, McDonald v. Rumford Sch. Dist., 609 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me. 1992), to hold that, when an employee suffers two work-related injuries that combine to produce a single incapacitating condition, the employer's entire liability is governed by the law at the time of the subsequent injury.
As the employee notes, the rule we enunciated in Ray was expressly rejected by the Legislature in subsection 201(6). See P.L. 1998, ch. 647. Were we to conclude that subsection 201(6) was inapplicable to the present case, however, the outcome would likely be governed by pre-1993 law as articulated in McDonald, 609 A.2d at 1163. In that event, we would have to conclude that Cust's entire liability is governed by the law relating to the later injury, and, therefore, following the 400-week period of partial benefits, the employer would be entitled to suspend all benefits.
Because we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the application of subsection 201(6) to cases in which the subsequent injury occurs after January 1, 1993, subsection 201(6) applies, and the University is entitled to suspend benefits for that portion of the employee's incapacity that is attributable to the 1988 injury. Because the he
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