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Doucette v. Washburn2/22/2001 or reduced use of a part of the human body, the court did not err in determining that the permanent impairment component constituted a non-marital asset.
3. Medical Costs
Determining the marital or non-marital nature of the medical costs component of the award should be a straightforward process. As with any other asset, the award will be presumed marital unless the spouse urging its non-marital status demonstrates that a specific amount has been allocated for reasonably certain future medical expenses, and thus, that the award compensates the spouse for anticipated, post-marital expenses.
The record before us is devoid of any specific evidence regarding medical expenses anticipated in the future or even incurred during the marriage. Washburn argues that since Doucette has not proved the presence of marital expenditures, the court was required to find that the medical cost component was non-marital. Nothing could be clearer, however, than our often repeated admonition that the spouse urging a non-marital designation has the burden of presenting evidence in support of that conclusion. See Clum v. Graves, 1999 ME 77, 10, 729 A.2d 900, 904-05.
Washburn failed to meet that burden. The record contains little more than Washburn's bald assertion that no marital funds had been expended on medical care. He presented no specific evidence that he would incur medical expenses after the marriage ended. On this record, the medical costs component would have to be determined to be a marital asset. The court, however, allocated the medical costs using the same ratio as applied to the wage replacement component, resulting in the determination that only approximately 13% of the medical component was marital. Because Washburn received the benefit of the court's calculation, and because Doucette does not challenge the result in light of our affirmance of the judgment, we do not disturb it.
B. Distribution of Marital Property
The total marital estate was valued at $331,407. Washburn received $58,639, or approximately 18% of the marital assets. In addition, the court set apart to him $267,019 in non-marital property. Accordingly, his assets upon dissolution of the marriage totaled $325,658. Doucette, who had no non-marital property, received the lion's share of the marital assets-$272,768. The court awarded no spousal support to either party.
Washburn contends that the court's distribution of marital property represents a plain and unmistakable injustice, that the court abused its discretion, and that the court should not have entwined Doucette's request for spousal support with its division of marital property.
We review the disposition of marital property for an abuse of discretion, Craigue, 617 A.2d at 1029, and we will overturn a divorce court's division of marital property if there is a "violation of some positive rule of law or if the division results in a 'plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.'" Pederson v. Pederson, 644 A.2d 1045, 1046 (Me. 1994) (citations omitted). In dividing marital property, the court must "divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors." 19-A M.R.S.A. ยง 953(1) (1998).
A just distribution of property is not synonymous with an equal distribution. To the contrary, we have made it clear that a court is not required to divide the marital property equally, but is required to make the division fair and just considering all of the circumstances of the parties. See Pederson, 644 A.2d at 1046; Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me. 1992); Deditch v. Deditch, 584
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