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Douglas v. Monroe2/26/2001
nship and that his actions should have put the woman on notice that he did not represent her. Id. at 1297-98 (emphasis added).
Our supreme court went on to say:
Also absent is any indication that, during the pendency of the medical malpractice action, the woman affirmatively consented to the respondent's representation of her. The malpractice complaint was officially filed pro se. Opposing counsel's contact was to be the woman, not the respondent. The woman testified that the respondent told her that he did not routinely handle medical malpractice cases. When the respondent telephoned her to inform her of possible impending discovery sanctions, she failed to return his call, thus indicating that she did not recognize the respondent as her attorney and saw no need or held no desire to confer with him.
In short, there is nothing in the record clearly establishing that the woman believed or had reason to believe that the respondent was her attorney in the medical malpractice action.
It appears that the assistance the respondent provided to her in relation to the malpractice action was fostered by his sympathy for her plight, and not by any desire to provide professional services to her. Our conclusion is not meant to contradict the Commission's assertion that the giving of legal advice is an essential element of an attorney-client relationship. However, the mere provision of nominal legal advice is not automatically dispositive where the existence of an attorney-client relationship is disputed. Id. at 1298 (emphases added).
Similarly, we have concluded that a buyer's attorney's preparation of closing documents and his act of presiding over a closing, standing alone, were insufficient to create a relationship or to render the attorney liable to the seller for any negligent acts associated with the transaction. Hacker, 570 N.E.2d at 956.
In contrast, our supreme court concluded that both an attorney and a putative client consented to the formation of an attorney-client relationship in Anonymous, 655 N.E.2d 67. In that case, however, (1) the attorney met with the putative client on several occasions and discussed a potential wrongful termination suit, a matter within the respondent's professional competence; (2) the attorney concluded that the putative client had a strong wrongful termination case; (3) the putative client thought the attorney was acting as his attorney; and (4) the attorney should have been aware that the putative client thought the attorney was representing him, but did nothing to dispel this belief. Id. at 70-71.
We find the present case more similar to Kinney and Hacker than to Anonymous. Here, Carol never met or spoke with Monroe. Moreover, she did not attempt to contact Monroe, schedule an appointment with her, or consent to the formation of an attorney-client relationship with her.
Carol neither entered into a contract for legal services with Monroe nor paid for advice from her. Carol never thought Monroe was representing her in the matter of Curtis's death. Indeed, when later contacted by her current counsel and asked if she was being represented, Carol replied "no." Further, there is no evidence that Monroe believed she was in any way representing Carol or that Monroe consented to the formation of an attorney-client relationship. Monroe's brief statement regarding the statute of limitations appears to have been fostered by sympathy, not by any desire to provide professional services to a woman she did not know.
As for the detrimental reliance theory, we have stated:
In certain cases, an attorney-client relationship may also be created by a client's detrimental rel
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