In re Ferrey6/26/2001
In this matter, Steven E. Ferrey, Esquire, a member in good standing of the Massachusetts bar, has moved for pro hac vice permission to provide legal services to a client in a continuing administrative proceeding before a state agency. He has done so pursuant to Article II, Rule 9 of our Supreme Court Rules. Based upon the contents of the affidavit filed as part of his motion, we grant that part of his motion seeking permission to practice before the Energy Facility Siting Board, effective as of the date of this opinion. We deny, however, that part of his motion seeking our permission, nunc pro tunc, to the date of his first appearance before that state agency, and we deem it advisable at this time to give our reasons for so doing.
We begin by noting that this Court never before, in any published opinion or order, has granted a pro hac vice request nunc pro tunc when to do so "would be tantamount to affixing an ex post facto imprimatur of approval on what might under some circumstances be construed as the unauthorized practice of law[,]" a criminal offense prohibited by G.L. 1956 § 11-27-5. In re Church, 111 R.I. 425, 427, 303 A.2d 758, 759 (1973). See also In re Olsen, 112 R.I. 673, 674, 314 A.2d 140, 141 (1974).
Since 1917, § 11-27-5 has provided that:
"No person, except a member of the bar of this state, whose authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, shall practice law in this state."
The practice of law is defined in § 11-27-2 as:
"the doing of any act for another person usually done by attorneys at law in the course of their profession, and, without limiting this generality, includes:
(1) The appearance or acting as the attorney, solicitor, or representative of another person before any court, referee, master, auditor, division, department, commission, board, judicial person, or body authorized or constituted by law to determine any question of law or fact or to exercise any judicial power, or the preparation of pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other proceeding of any kind before or to be brought before the court or other body[.]" (Emphasis added.)
Recognizing that circumstances might arise when a particular client might on "special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown" require the assistance of an out-of-state attorney in a particular court proceeding in this state, this Court promulgated Rule 9 of Article II of our Supreme Court Rules concerning the admission of out-of-state counsel to practice law in this state.
It is important for the bar, as well as the various state agencies, boards and commissions, to note that Rule 9 pertains only to the granting of pro hac vice permission by this Court for an out-of-state attorney to represent a client in a cause or appeal "in any court of this state." There is nothing in Rule 9 that makes reference for admission pro hac vice of an out-of-state attorney to practice law here before any state or municipal board, agency or commission. That omission in Rule 9, however, does not deprive us of our unquestioned inherent right to permit an out-of-state attorney to do so upon a timely pro hac vice request by out-of-state counsel. In that regard, this Court recognizes full well that " ' ractice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court.' " Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association, 55 R.I. 122, 134, 179 A. 139, 144 (1935).
Consequently, because this Court has exclusive and ultimate authority to determine who may, and may not be permitted to practice law in
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Rhode Island Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|