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Bliss v. Stow Mills6/27/2001
Cheshire
The plaintiff, Robert Bliss, appeals the decision of the Superior Court (Arnold, J.) dismissing his claim against the defendant, Stow Mills, Inc. (Stow Mills), for wrongful discharge. The superior court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the federal Surface Transportation and Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA), codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 31101 et seq. (1996 & Supp. 2000), preempts New Hampshire common law claims for wrongful discharge. We reverse and remand.
The following facts are not disputed. Stow Mills, located in Chesterfield, is a wholesale distributor of natural foods and employed the plaintiff as a truck driver for approximately ten years before he was discharged in 1994. In November 1993, Stow Mills' drivers held their annual meeting to select delivery routes. The plaintiff selected a route called the "Hadley Run #312." This route required the plaintiff to deliver products to stores in Massachusetts and Connecticut.
The trucking operations of Stow Mills are governed by the STAA and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety regulations. See 49 U.S.C. § 31136. In particular, the federal regulations prohibit truck drivers from driving " or any period after having been on duty 15 hours following 8 consecutive hours off duty." 49 C.F.R. § 395.3(a)(2). On numerous occasions, the plaintiff notified Stow Mills that Hadley Run #312 could not be completed within the federally regulated fifteen-hour time frame. According to the plaintiff, Stow Mills responded by blaming him for being unproductive. Shortly before the 1994 annual drivers' meeting, the plaintiff told Stow Mills he would no longer drive Hadley Run #312 and would report to authorities what he considered to be federal violations. The plaintiff alleges that Stow Mills retaliated by wrongfully terminating his employment.
The plaintiff brought suit, alleging a common law claim for wrongful discharge and a claim under the Whistleblower's Protection Act, see RSA ch. 275-E (1999 & Supp. 2000). The trial court dismissed the latter claim based upon the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, ruling that the STAA preempts it. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court's preemption ruling is erroneous as a matter of law.
The STAA was enacted in 1983 and required the United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration to establish extensive safety regulations for long-haul drivers and motor carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 31136. The principal purposes of the statute and its regulations are to promote the safe operation of commercial carriers on interstate highways and to protect the safety of commercial carrier drivers. See 49 U.S.C. § 31131(a).
In order to encourage the reporting of safety violations, the STAA affords drivers who refuse to break the law or drive vehicles they believe to be unsafe some degree of protection from retaliatory actions by employers. See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258 (1986); 49 U.S.C. § 31105. Section 31105 of the STAA states:
(a) Prohibitions. – (1) A person may not discharge an employee, or discipline or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment, because –
(A) the employee, or another person at the employee's request, has filed a complaint or begun a proceeding related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, or order, or has testified or will testify in such a proceeding; or
(B) the employee refuses to operate a vehicle because –
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