Rosati v. Boston Pip Covering6/19/2001
Middlesex.
January 12, 2001.
Practice, Civil, Jury trial. Constitutional Law, Trial by jury. Jury and Jurors. Contract, Employment.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 17, 1995.
A motion to strike a request for a jury trial was heard by Maria I. Lopez, J., and the case was heard by Charles T. Spurlock, J.
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
Alleging that the defendant, their former employer, had failed to pay them the prevailing wage for work they performed pursuant to a public construction project at Logan International Airport, the plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to G. L. c. 149, ? 27, seeking to recover lost wages and benefits, treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. The defendant filed an answer requesting a jury trial, whereupon the plaintiffs moved to strike that request. The motion judge, finding that the action was entirely statutory and that the statute lacked an express grant of trial by jury, struck the defendant's request, and the case proceeded to a trial without jury. The trial judge found that the defendant had violated the provisions of G. L. c. 149, ? 27, and awarded back wages, treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The defendant appealed, and the Appeals Court reversed the judgment on the ground that the defendant's request for trial by jury had been erroneously denied. Rosati v. Boston Pipe Covering, Inc., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 121 (1999). We granted the plaintiffs' application for further appellate review. We agree with the Appeals Court that the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury, and therefore vacate the judgment and remand the matter for retrial.
"In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury . . . ." Art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. Article 15 "must be construed with 'flexibility in its adaptation of details to the changing needs of society without in any degree impairing its essential character.'" Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc., 418 Mass. 220, 222 (1994), quoting Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 467, 473 (1913).
The "narrowly defined" exception to the right of jury trial set forth in art. 15 ("except in cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practiced") removes only those cases "in which a court of equity in either England or Massachusetts would have exercised jurisdiction in 1780." Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc., supra. Thus, if "the plaintiff's claim is analogous, in either subject matter or remedy sought, to cases within the court's equity jurisdiction, as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution," there is no right to trial by jury. Id. at 223. Otherwise, the right to trial by jury remains "sacred." Id. at 222.
The present plaintiffs are suing for "lost wages and benefits," on the ground that they were underpaid for the work they performed for the defendant. Their suit is a "controvers concerning property," and it is a suit "between two or more persons," thus bringing the action plainly within art. 15.
Nothing about the claim makes it one that traditionally came within the court's equity jurisdiction. Rather, the claim is essentially an action in law sounding in contract. " he ordinary action of contract is a controversy concerning property, in which trial by jury was had as of right at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." Farnham v. Lenox Motor Car Co., 229 Mass. 478, 4
Page 1 2 Massachusetts Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|