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Card v. United States6/28/2001 e a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the peremptory strike (step 2 of the Batson challenge) or because it was pretextual (step 3). We begin by noting that "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett, supra, 514 U.S. at 768. Moreover, we give "great deference" to a trial court's findings with regard to discriminatory intent. See Evans v. United States, 682 A.2d 644, 651 (D.C. 1996). In the Batson context, "the trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991 (plurality opinion, citing Batson). See Washington Metro. Area Transportation Auth. v. Jeanty, 718 A.2d 172, 180 n.14 (D.C. 1998) ("This finding by the judge [that the prosecution's peremptory strikes were non-discriminatory] turned on his on-the-scene assessment of counsel's credibility, and we are in no position to second-guess a determination which was obviously informed by the judge's observation of counsel's demeanor."). A successful race-based Batson challenge requires a finding that a strike was the result of "racially discriminatory intent or purpose"; racially disproportionate impact is not enough. Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at 359-60 (plurality) (citation omitted); id. at 372-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Batson does not require that a prosecutor justify a jury strike at the level of a for-cause challenge. It also does not require that the justification be unrelated to race. Batson requires only that the prosecutor's reason for striking a juror not be the juror's race." Id. at 375 (emphasis in original).
When faced with appellants' argument, the trial court ruled that the prosecutor's "gut" reaction to the concerns raised by the juror's appearance -- "the bow tie, the close cropped hair, and other issues" --was credible, and not race-based. The court drew on its own practical experience, stating:
This court is personally aware that there have been several jury trials in this court where there have been 11 to 1 hung juries for the very same reason mentioned by [the prosecutor]. As a matter of fact, this Court tried one of those cases.
Appellants argue that a white man dressed like Juror 333 would not have been stricken. The trial court could reasonably conclude that this did not automatically translate into the requisite racially discriminatory intent or purpose, given the apparently limited composition of the group in question. In the recent case of United States v. Blanding, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 9862 (4th Cir. 2001), defense counsel for a black defendant struck a white juror whose car had a Confederate flag bumper sticker. The juror had disclaimed "anything having to do with the sentiment," but defense counsel said that nonetheless he was concerned about it. The trial court's ruling that the stated reason was a pretext for purposeful racial discrimination (each of defense counsel's strikes had been of white jurors) was reversed by the appellate court. That court held that the inference that defense counsel had drawn was a "permissible, persuasive, race-neutral inference in the context of a peremptory challenge under the Equal Protection Clause." See also United States v. Hinton, 94 F.3d 396, 397 (7th Cir. 1996) (striking juror because he wore a "Malcolm X" hat was a race-neutral reason; " he prosecutor's focus was on a perceived militant anti-government aspect of Malcolm X, not his race"); United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992) (striking juror because of association with "black activist groups" was not a race-ba
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