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Card v. United States6/28/2001 en informed by the government that he could have been charged, but after he agreed to testify in this case, charges were never brought against him. Likewise, Bears denied that he was placed in a halfway house, rather than prison, as a result of his testifying, but nevertheless admitted that he was incarcerated prior to his involvement with the government and was in fact placed in a halfway house where he received weekend passes, on the basis of an unopposed release motion after he testified before the grand jury. Bears also admitted that he escaped from the halfway house but was never charged with a crime for that action.
Bears was cross-examined with the aid of a transcript demonstrating that the prosecutor in this case appeared at Bears' sentencing on his then-pending charges, and that another prosecutor, at another sentencing hearing, indicated that Bears may have been forced into a plea. He was cross-examined on the basis of another transcript wherein, at a sentencing hearing for the PWID and pistol charges, Bears' attorney represented in open court that because of his cooperation in this case, he might make a motion to withdraw his plea. Furthermore, Bears admitted that, after testifying before the grand jury, he was arrested for uttering (stealing a check), that following the arrest he had called the prosecutor in this case, and that the charge was subsequently dropped ("no papered"). He was cross-examined extensively regarding his possible bias arising from this treatment. While disclosure of the allegedly explicit deals, if they indeed existed, was required by Brady and Giglio, the presentation of the witness to the jury demonstrated something far less than an unblemished facade. The jury was markedly exposed to the witness's potential for bias and lack of credibility. See Johnson v. United States, 537 A.2d 555, 559-60 (D.C. 1988) ("In light of . . . both the jury's and defense counsel's independent awareness of the circumstances implying the witness' bias and questionable credibility, we find no reasonable probability that disclosure of the [alleged Brady material] would have affected the outcome of appellant's trial."); Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C.) (in evaluating an alleged Giglio violation, " e . . . may consider the fact that [the witness's] credibility was successfully undermined in other ways"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 992 (1986).
Second, appellants claim that relevant Giglio and Brady material was not produced with respect to government witness Ida Stanford. Specifically, they contend that the government intervened on behalf of Stanford to reduce a mandatory twenty year sentence on an unrelated charge to probation, among other claims. However, in light of the trial testimony, appellants fail to adequately demonstrate a reasonable probability that such disclosures undermine the verdict.
Like Bears, the jury was informed of Stanford's extensive criminal past, including her involvement in drugs and arms and her role as a "very large drug dealer in this town." She also admitted that she had lied under oath in a previous trial. She testified further that she had entered an agreement with the government, whereby her cooperation would be reported to the sentencing judge in her pending case. She stated that, based on the subsequent report from the government regarding her cooperation, "the [sentencing] Judge [could] disregard my guidelines and not sentence me to the mandatory 20 years." She explained that the government was not required to file a guidelines departure letter on her behalf, and that if one was filed, the sentencing judge need not follow it. However, she admitted that if she broke the terms of her agreement "the departure letter provision" w
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