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State v. Wilson5/31/2001
ound reason why the legal interpretation of the statutes should be any different." Santeyan, 136 Ariz. at 110, 664 P.2d at 654.
The similarity between § 12-2235 and § 13-4062(4), however, does not support the state's argument that § 23-908(C) abrogates the privilege here. In interpreting § 23-908(C), we seek to give effect to the plain and obvious meaning of its terms. See State v. Jones, 188 Ar iz. 388, 392, 937 P. 2d 310, 314 (1997). We also read the statute as a whole in order to give meaningful operation to each provision and avoid rendering any of its language superfluous. Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ar iz. 430, , 4 P. 3d 973, (App. 1999). When a statutory scheme expressly defines certain terms, we are bound by those definitions in construing a statute within that scheme. Id.
By its terms and its placement in Title 23, A.R. S., § 23-908(C) only affects the privilege in workers' compensation cases, not in other civil actions or cr iminal cases such as this. Moreover, § 23-908(C) removes certain information from the category of "privileged communication " only if several qualifying conditions are met. For example, the information must be "requested by interested parties for a proper understanding of the case and a determination of the rights involved. " § 23-908(C). For pur poses of the workers' compensation chapter, A.R. S. §§ 23-901 through 23-1091, " ' nterested party' means the employer, the employee, or if the employee is deceased, the surviving spouse or dependents, the [industrial] commission, the insurance carrier or their r epresentative. " § 23-901(9). That statutory definition does not include the state or any other prosecutorial agency. The state neither fits within any of the definitional categories nor suggests that it r epresents the City or any other " interested party. " Moreover, the state does not argue or even address whether its desire to use Krasner's testimony equates to the limited purpose for which information may be requested, and is thereby rendered non-privileged, pursuant to § 23-908(C): "a pr oper understanding of the case and a determination of the rights involved." In our view, those purposes refer and relate only to the workers' compensation "case" and " the rights involved" therein. That otherwise privileged information may aid the state to "pr oper understand " and prove this criminal case does not abrogate Wilson's privilege under § 13-4062(4) as to Krasner's proffered testimony.
The state's reliance on § 23-908(A) and (D) also is misplaced. Subsection (A) requires a physician to file with the industr ial commission and the employer's insurance carr ier "a full and complete report of every known injury to the employee arising out of or in the course of his employment and resulting in loss of life or injury." Subsection (D) requires a physician "employed by the injured employee forthwith repor t the accident and the injury resulting therefrom to the employer, the insurance carrier and the commission." Those statutes neither require a physician to report potential criminal activity nor expressly waive any privilege, particularly for purposes of cr iminal investigation or trial. That a physician must report accidents and injuries does not result in a total abr ogation or general waiver of the privilege as to other information the physician might obtain from the patient. Cf. In re Search Warrant for 2045 Franklin, Denver, Colorado, 709 P. 2d 597, 601 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (patients enrolling in Medicaid program impliedly waive physician-patient privilege only "to the extent necessary for the state to verify the services billed by the provider" ).
For the first time at oral argument, without citing any pertinent authorit
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