 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Wilson5/31/2001
" communications made by the patient to his physician for the purpose of treatment," Santeyan, 136 Ariz. at 110, 664 P.2d at 654, so as "to insur e that the patient will receive the best medical treatment by encouraging full and frank disclosure of medical history and symptoms by a patient to his doctor." Lewin v. Jackson, 108 Ar iz. 27, 31, 492 P.2d 406, 410 (1972).
For the privilege to apply, four elements must exist: (1) the patient must not consent to the proffered testimony; (2) the witness must be a physician or surgeon; (3) the information must have been imparted while the physician was attending the defendant; and (4) "'the information must be necessary to enable the physician to prescribe or act for the tr eatment of the defendant.'" Morales, 170 Ariz. at 363, 824 P.2d at 759, quoting State v. Beaty, 158 Ar iz. 232, 239, 762 P. 2d 519, 526 (1988). Only the fourth element is at issue here.
I. Does Alleged Purpose of Visiting Physician Render Privilege Inapplicable?
The state first asserts generally that the pr ivilege does not preclude Krasner's testimony because Wilson did not consult or communicate with him "for the purpose of treatment because there was no injury to treat." Rather, the state argues, Wilson visited all the doctors "for the purpose of pecuniary gain," through the filing and pursuing of " a false Worker's Compensation claim." We do not find these arguments persuasive.
Even if a patient has an underlying financial motive or goal in seeking treatment, that does not necessarily mean information divulged by the patient is not " necessary to enable the physician . . . to prescribe or act for the patient. " ยง 13-4062(4). That is to say, a patient may trigger the privilege by consulting with a physician even though the patient has ulterior motives in seeking or obtaining treatment. See People v. Sinski, 669 N.E.2d 809, 813 (N. Y. 1996) ("any communications between defendant and his doctors in furtherance of his treatment were obtained in violation of defendant's physician-patient privilege and improperly admitted at trial," despite charge that defendant had obtained prescriptions for narcotic pain medications by fraud and deceit).
Moreover, the state's argument rests on the premise that Wilson committed workers' compensation fraud, a charge that, as yet, is unproven. In essence, the state's position begs the question by implicitly assuming that Wilson's consultation with Krasner and the other physicians constituted fraud. That assumption, however, cannot justify disregarding the pr ivilege in order for the state, in bootstrap fashion, to obtain evidence it allegedly needs to prove that the assumption is accurate. In the absence of any supporting authority, we reject as overbroad the state's apparent contention that public policy automatically justifies an abrogation of the privilege whenever a patient merely has been charged with fraud in making or pursuing a workers' compensation claim. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 610 F. Supp. 546 (D. Minn. 1985) (privilege applied to bar psychiatrist records that insur ance company sought in order to pr ove fraudulent scheme to procure insur ance policies); Sinski; cf. State v. Elwell, 567 A. 2d 1002, 1007 (N.H. 1989) ("A criminal defendant does not put his medical condition at issue simply by proclaiming his innocence. To hold otherwise would allow the State to defeat the physician-patient privilege simply by accusing a defendant of a crime. We do not believe the legislature intended that result. ").
Citing Benton v. Superior Court, 182 Ar iz. 466, 897 P.2d 1352 (App. 1994), the state contends " he public's inter est in protecting victim
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Arizona Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|