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Carey v. Chessie Computer Services11/14/2001
usly filed in the action, . . . be served upon" the third party. Md. Rule 2-332(a). Nothing more is required.
Moreover, to interpolate a requirement that judicial approval must be first sought and obtained would further violate the canons of statutory construction by adding language so as to "`reflect an intent not evidenced in that language.'" Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dir. of Fin. for the Mayor of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 579 (1996) (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 (1993)); see also Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181 (2001); Lendo, 295 Md. at 63.
Finally, we "confirm the meaning reached by reference to the words" by considering the statute "in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part." Vieira, 340 Md. at 658. In the Workers' Compensation Act, when the legislature wanted the parties to seek leave of court, it expressly said so. Under L.E. § 9-726(a), for example, a party must file "with the Commission a written motion" in order to have a case reheard. And under L.E. § 9-736(a), a readjustment of the rate of compensation may be made by the Commission "on the application of any party in interest or on its own motion. . . ." In addition, L.E. § 9-652(a) provides that "an employer who is liable for the full extent of the occupational deafness of the covered employee may implead any other employer in whose employment the covered employee was exposed to harmful noise." To implead the other employer under this section, the impleading employer must simply provide notice "to the impleaded employer and to the Commission" on a form provided by the Commission. L.E. § 9-652(b). No motion is required, and leave of court is not necessary to bring the potentially liable employer into the action.
We conclude, therefore, that Judge Turnbull was required by L.E. § 9-807 to either grant appellees' motion to implead without delay or to treat the motion itself as a written impleader and to remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings with the Fund present. His failure to do so was error, and the order he issued, granting summary judgment in favor of appellant, was void ab initio. Because that order was void ab initio, "there was nothing from which" appellees could have appealed. In Re Appeal No. 371, 24 Md. App. 95, 99 (1974). Accordingly, appellant's claim that appellees, "having failed to file a timely appeal, barred by res judicata from attacking the judgment of [Judge Turnbull]" is meritless.
Having concluded that Judge Hennegan did not err in considering the Commission's 1996 decision, as appellant maintains, we now determine whether Judge Hennegan was "legally correct" in granting summary judgment to appellees on the ground that the 1996 decision "became of no effect upon the impleader of the Subsequent Injury Fund." We hold that he was not.
Appellees argue that the Commission's 1996 decision was rendered "null and void" upon the impleading of the Fund. In support of that claim, appellees cite Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson, 60 Md. App. 659 (1984), aff'd, 306 Md. 492 (1986). In Eastern Stainless Steel, the "Employer/Insurer," as the appellant was designated in that case, filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, seeking review of a decision of the Commission awarding the claimant compensation for his injuries. Id. at 662. After filing that action, the employer/insurer moved to implead the Fund. Id. The court granted that motion, suspended further proceedings, and remanded the case to the Commission. Id. Upon remand, the employer/insurer, claimant, and Fund participated in a hearing before the Commission. Following that hearing, the court again decided that the clai
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