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Carey v. Chessie Computer Services11/14/2001
ourt, "the court shall: (i) suspend further proceedings; and (ii) remand the case to the Commission. . . ." L.E. § 9-807(b)(2). " rdinarily the word `shall,' unless the context within which it is used indicates otherwise, is mandatory when used in a statute, and thus denotes an imperative obligation inconsistent with the idea of discretion." Bright v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169-70 (1975). Consequently, Judge Turnbull did not have the discretion to delay ruling on that motion until he had ruled on other motions presented by the parties. To conclude otherwise would undercut the very purpose of L.E. § 9-807, which is to ensure that the Fund has the opportunity to participate in all proceedings in which its interests are at stake. Undoubtedly, the Fund had an interest in Judge Turnbull's decision granting appellant's motion for summary judgment, which affirmed the Commission's 1996 decision, awarding benefits to appellant. Moreover, any interpretation of L.E. § 9-807 that permits the circuit court to exercise discretion as to when to grant a motion to implead will inevitably lead to "inconsistent results," particularly, if the circuit court, as here, delays remand until it has ruled on key issues. Upon remand, the Fund has the opportunity to "assert a complete defense to the claim against it, including raising the issues of accidental injury and causal connection." Ehrman, 89 Md. App. at 752. As the Commission will then have the opportunity to "determine all issues anew," Carroll v. State of Maryland, Patuxent Inst., 136 Md. App. 319, 329 (2001), it may reach a completely different conclusion. In that event, if the first judicial decision is permitted to stand - in this case Judge Turnbull's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellant on the issue of employer/insurer liability - and the Commission's post-remand decision is subsequently affirmed by the circuit court, the result will be two standing judgments, involving the same issues in the same case and in direct conflict with each other. It is precisely to prevent such an occurrence that we are enjoined to construe a statute to avoid "inconsistent results." Smack, 143 Md. App. at 420; Western Correctional Inst. v. Geiger, 130 Md. App. 562, 568 (2000).
Moreover, it was within Judge Turnbull's discretion to treat the motion to implead as tantamount to impleading the Fund. L.E. § 9-807 does not require that a party seeking to implead the Fund must first obtain leave of court. It merely states that "any party in interest" that wishes to implead the Fund shall "(1) give written notice to the State Treasurer or the attorney for the Subsequent Injury Fund . . . and (2) implead the Fund, in writing, as a party." L.E. § 9-807(a). Nowhere is the party required to file a motion to implead or to otherwise seek court approval.
In fact, L.E. § 9-807, for the purpose of impleading the Fund, places the parties to the action on an equal footing with the Commission (which of course does not need the circuit court's permission to implead the Fund) by stating that "the Commission or any party in interest" may implead the Fund by giving proper notice and then impleading the Fund in writing. L.E. § 9-807(a)(1)(2). No motion is required.
Nor is there any indication in either the language or history of this provision that the legislature intended to add a requirement that does not exist, to our knowledge, anywhere else in Maryland law. In the Maryland Rules, for example, Rule 2-332 governs impleading in civil actions. There, the only requirement for impleading a third party is that the impleader "cause a summons and complaint, together with a copy of all pleadings, scheduling notices, court orders, and other papers previo
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