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Carey v. Chessie Computer Services11/14/2001
judgment in favor of appellant and thereby affirmed the Commission's 1996 decision. We disagree.
The doctrine of res judicata "precludes the relitigation of matters that have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided between parties, by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction." Murray International Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 (1989). Res judicata has three elements: "(1) the parties in the second litigation are the same, or in privity, with the parties in the earlier case; (2) the second suit presents the same cause of action as the first suit; and (3) the first suit produced a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction." Roane v. Washington County Hosp., 137 Md. App. 582, 590 (2001). It is as to the third element that appellant's res judicata argument fails. Judge Turnbull had no authority to grant appellant's motion for summary judgment. Once the motion to implead was before Judge Turnbull, he was required to grant it pursuant to L.E. § 9-807 and then remand the case to the Commission.
L.E. § 9-807 provides:
(a) In General. - In any case involving payment from the Subsequent Injury Fund, the Commission or any party in interest shall:
(1) give written notice to the State Treasurer or the attorney for the Subsequent Injury Fund that the Subsequent Injury Fund is or may be involved in the case; and
(2) implead the Fund, in writing, as a party.
(b) Time of impleading. - (1) The Subsequent Injury Fund may be impleaded at any stage of the proceedings:
(i) before the Commission; or
(ii) on appeal.
(2) If the Subsequent Injury Fund is impleaded on appeal before a circuit court or the Court of Special Appeals, the court shall:
(i) suspend further proceedings; and
(ii) remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings to give the Subsequent Injury Fund an opportunity to defend against the claim.
In interpreting L.E. § 9-807, we apply the standard rules of statutory construction. " he cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent." Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 (2000); Prince George's County, Maryland v. Vieira, 340 Md. 651, 658 (1995). "`The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself. . . .'" Subsequent Injury Fund v. Ehrman, 89 Md. App. 741, 747 (1992) (quoting Mazor v. Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355 (1977)). "If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is usually no need to look further." Gary v. State, 341 Md. 513, 521 (1996). "Even if the statute is clear and unambiguous, however, `we are not precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal' of the law." Azarian v. Witte, 2001 Md. App. LEXIS 138 at *37 (2001) (quoting Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 604 (1990)) (internal citations omitted). In interpreting statutory language, we must give the words their "ordinary and natural meaning." In Re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 (1994). Also, we must avoid an interpretation that would produce "an illogical, absurd, or inconsistent result." Smack v. Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, 134 Md. App. 412, 420 (2000). And we "may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form." Board of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63 (1982). See also Taylor v. Nationsbank, 365 Md. 166, 181 (2001).
The language of L.E. § 9-807 is clear and unambiguous. It provides that either "the Commission or any party in interest" may implead the Fund. L.E. § 9-807(a). Once the Fund is impleaded, if done before the circuit c
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