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Carey v. Chessie Computer Services11/14/2001
o appellant and thereby affirmed the Commission's 1996 decision. And fourth, appellant asserts that " he order of the Workers' Compensation Commission of January 18, 2000 was correct."
As stated earlier, this matter is before us on an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees. "Summary judgment may be invoked to prevent an unnecessary trial in a worker compensation appeal, just as in any other action." Dawson's Charter Serv. v. Chin, 68 Md. App. 433, 440 (1986). As in any other action, it is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and . . . the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Md. Rule 2-501(e). In considering a grant of summary judgment we "review the same material from the record and decide the same legal issues as the circuit court." Lopata v. Miller, 122 Md. App. 76, 84 (1998). In doing so, "we do not accord deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Id. at 83. The standard for reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion is "whether the trial court was legally correct." Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 (1990).
We begin our analysis with appellant's jurisdictional argument. Appellant contends that Judge Hennegan had no jurisdiction to grant summary judgment in favor of appellees, given Judge Turnbull's earlier order granting appellant's partial motion to dismiss. Judge Turnbull's order meant, according to appellant, that "there was no case pending before [Judge Hennegan] with respect to the appeal of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission dated November 18, 1996." Appellant's argument, however, ignores the fact that this was not the only issue raised by appellees' petition for judicial review and therefore it was not the only one before Judge Hennegan. In that petition, appellees sought review of both the 1996 and the 2000 decisions of the Commission. Thus, Judge Turnbull's order dismissing appellees' action for judicial review of the Commission's 1996 decision did not adjudicate all of the claims in that petition. Consequently, it was not a final judgment, and was therefore subject to revision by Judge Hennegan. We explain.
Maryland Rule 2-602(a) states in part that:
n order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action . . . or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action:
(1) is not a final judgment;
(2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or any of the parties; and
(3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and against all of the parties.
In short, "Rule 2-602(a) makes clear that an order that does not adjudicate all of the claims in an action, or that adjudicates less than an entire claim . . . is not a final judgment and may be revised at any time before the entry of a final judgment." Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 272-73 (1995). We now apply that rule to appellant's claim that Judge Hennegan was deprived of jurisdiction by Judge Turnbull's dismissal of appellees' claim as to the 1996 Commission decision.
In the instant case, Judge Turnbull's order of June 1, 2000, granted appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and denied appellees' request in their petition for judicial review of the Commission's 1996 decision. As previously mentioned, in that petition for review, appellant also sought review of the Commission's 2000 Award. Consequently, Judge Turnbull's ord
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