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Campise v. Morrison Health Care12/31/2001
On August 13, 1998, Kari Campise (Campise) filed a complaint against Morrison Health Care, Inc. (Morrison) and Valley Children's Hospital (VCH) pursuant to Government Code section 12900 et. seq., the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Morrison filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. We reverse because the pleadings filed in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment disclose that there are triable issues of material fact.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The initial complaint named VCH and numerous doe defendants and asserted a cause of action pursuant to section 12940. An amendment identifying Morrison as one of the doe defendants was filed on October 8, 1998. Campise's complaint set forth a single cause of action against VCH and Morrison, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. VCH filed an answer on October 5, 1998. On November 23, 1998, Morrison filed an answer generally denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses.
Morrison and VCH filed separate summary judgment motions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. Morrison's motion was filed on June 3, 1999; VCH's on June 4, 1999. In addition to the motion, Morrison filed a memorandum of points and authorities, separate statement of undisputed facts, declarations, and numerous deposition transcripts.
Campise filed a response disputing purported undisputed facts contained in Morrison's statement of undisputed facts, declarations in opposition to the motion, a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition, and a separate statement of undisputed material facts.
By order dated July 29, 1999, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Morrison. Judgment was entered on October 28, 1999, in favor of Morrison.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Code of Civil procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), summary judgment is proper if the supporting papers are sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the moving party as a matter of law and the opposing party presents no evidence giving rise to a triable issue as to any material fact.
"To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the defendant must conclusively negate a necessary element of the plaintiff's case or establish a complete defense. Where the evidence presented by defendant does not support judgment in his favor, the motion must be denied without looking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff.... Where there is no material issue of fact to be tried and the sole question before the court is one of law, it is the duty of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment to hear and determine the issue of law." (Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 880, 886, citations omitted.)
As the reviewing court, we determine de novo whether an issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1601.) In other words, we must assume the role of the trial court and reassess the merits of the motion. (Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 717.)
Ordinarily, we first identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond. Second, we determine whether the moving party's showing satisfies its burden of proof and justifies a judgment in its favor. Third, if the summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, we finally determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Ibid.)
Our review and analysis of the evidence is go
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