Handrahan v. Red Roof Inns6/23/1997
Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Burden of proof, Prima facie case, Employment, Damages. Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury. Evidence, Expert opinion. Damages, Punitive.
BROWN, J. On April 30, 1992, the plaintiff, Susan Handrahan, filed this action in Superior Court alleging that the defendant, Red Roof Inns, Inc. (Red Roof), discriminated against her on the basis of her handicap. See G. L. c. 151B, § 4. Following a jury trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff $1,705,000 in damages; that amount was comprised of $55,000 in back pay, $600,000 in front pay, $50,000 for emotional distress, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The defendant then filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.), new trial, and remittitur. The Judge denied the defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and new trial but allowed its motion for remittitur, reducing the front pay award by $112,200 and the punitive damage award by $900,000. Judgment was subsequently entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $732,700. Both parties appeal from the judgment.
We first consider the defendant's contention that the trial Judge erred in denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. The defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of discrimination under G. L. c. 151B, § 4(16).
In bringing a claim for handicap discrimination under this section, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Tardanico v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 443, 447, 671 N.E.2d 510 (1996). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for its actions. Ibid. Thereafter, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's asserted reason was not the true reason, but rather a pretext. Ibid. "If the fact finder concludes that the plaintiff has proved that the employer's reasons are a pretext, then the plaintiff prevails." Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 446, 646 N.E.2d 111 (1995).
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the following facts. The plaintiff, an epileptic, began working for the defendant as a housekeeper in 1983. At that time, she did not disclose her epilepsy to the defendant because she feared that she might be fired. From December, 1983, through December, 1990, the plaintiff received favorable performance evaluations and, on several occasions, was generally noted as being a good employee. The plaintiff, however, was often criticized for her inability to clean her assigned rooms in a timely manner.
On the morning of April 10, 1991, the plaintiff suffered an epileptic seizure while at her brother's home. Since the plaintiff was scheduled to work that day, her sister-in-law called the defendant and spoke with one of its female employees. She told the woman that the plaintiff had had a "grand mal seizure," and requested that she relay this information to the plaintiff's boss. The woman agreed to do so. When the plaintiff returned to work the next day, her boss, Brian Thompson, requested a note from her doctor. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a doctor's note indicating that she could return to work. The note, which contained the heading "Neurological Services," made no mention of the plaintiff having had a seizure. On April 16, 1991, the plaintiff told Thompson that she needed to leave work early because her medication had made her tired.
On April 11, 1991, Annie M. Cowles, a former coworker of the plaintiff, filed a complaint against the defendant with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. In her complaint, Cowles alleged that the
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