 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Thompson v. Claw Island Foods5/8/1998
nized, section 214 is based on Michigan law. See L.D. 2364, Statement of Fact (115th Legis. 1991); Bureau, 678 A.2d at 589-90. Because the Michigan statute is based on the Michigan common law "favored work" doctrine, see Pulver v. Dundee Cement Co., 515 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Mich. 1994), and because there is no evidence that our Legislature intended to adopt Michigan common law, we have not followed decisions of the Michigan courts in our interpretation of subsection 214(1)(A). See Bureau, 678 A.2d at 589-90. Because the statutory language of subsection 214(1) is virtually identical to the Michigan statute, however, we may still look to decisions of Michigan courts for guidance when the courts have applied an analysis that reflects the same policy and language as Maine's statute.
The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the reference point for the employee's residence in determining whether an offer of employment was reasonable; however, a recent decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals is on point. See Jones-Jennings v. Hutzel Hosp., 565 N.W.2d 680, 686-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). In that case, the employee married after her injury and moved 142 miles away from her employer's location. After her relocation, she was offered suitable light-duty work by her pre-injury employer. The magistrate concluded that although the employee had not yet obtained post-injury employment at the time of the hearing, the Michigan employer had not offered the employee "reasonable employment" because it was not within a reasonable distance from her residence at the time of the offer. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that residence referred to the employee's residence at the time of the injury. The Michigan Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Appellate Division, concluding that, as a matter of common usage, the term "residence" refers to "the one place the employee actually and permanently intends to reside, at the time the offer is made." Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
This debate within the Michigan system is illustrative of the difficulties inherent in overlaying a single definition of residence on the language of statutes that are silent on the point. We decline to accept the hard and fast rule adopted in Jones-Jennings. Rather, we rely on the sound discretion of the Board as factfinder to determine whether the residence relevant to the job offer at hand is the residence of the employee at the time of injury or at the time of the offer. B. Good and Reasonable Cause
If the Board determines that a bona fide offer of "reasonable employment" has been made, it must then determine whether the employee declined that offer for "good and reasonable cause." As always, the Board must consider all facts relevant to the employee's decision to decline the job offer. When the employee has relocated, the Board may again consider the reasons for the relocation.
The Michigan Supreme Court has considered this separate issue on several occasions and its analysis in this area is instructive. One important Michigan case, Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co., 312 N.W.2d 640 (Mich. 1981), decided prior to the enactment of section 418.301(5)(a), involved an employee who declined a reinstatement offer of light duty work because he had found post-injury employment in Florida. See Bower, 312 N.W.2d at 642-43. The court held that the employee was justified in refusing the favored work offer after accepting work in Florida, stating that "initiative and industriousness, should be encouraged," and that " o deny benefits in the instant circumstances not only would punish this employee for finding and holding substitute work, but also would severely undercut the rehabilitative and mitigative purposes
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Maine Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|