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Coker v. City of Lewiston4/30/1998
Reporter of Decisions
Argued: December 1, 1997
This case requires us to decide whether a recipient of general assistance who has performed "workfare" to maintain eligibility for that assistance is entitled to offset the value of that workfare against the recipient's obligation to reimburse the municipality for the general assistance received. Because we conclude that the recipient is entitled to such an offset, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Atwood, J.) affirming the hearing officer's decision to the contrary.
The facts are undisputed. The City of Lewiston provided Marvin Coker with general assistance and required him to perform work through its municipal work program intermittently between October 1993 and August 1995. In total, the City provided Coker with $1,651.85 in general assistance and Coker performed 285 hours of workfare valued at $1,211.25 if compensable at the then-existing minimum wage of $4.25 per hour. See 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4316-A(2)(A) (Supp. 1997).
During an intervening period of private employment, Coker injured his back, applied for workers' compensation, and was awarded $1,267.68. At the City's request, pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4318 (1992 & Supp. 1997), Coker authorized a lien on his workers' compensation award to reimburse the City for the general assistance it had provided him. The City then enforced the lien and, because that amount was less than the $1,651.85 of general assistance provided to Coker, kept the entire $1,267.68 award.
Coker appealed to the City's fair hearing authority, citing 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4316-A(2)(A) and arguing that the value of his workfare operated as an offset against the general assistance he received. Accordingly, Coker asserted that the City owed him $827.08. The hearing officer concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4322 (Supp. 1997). On appeal to the Superior Court, the court (Alexander, J.) ruled that the hearing officer did have jurisdiction and remanded the matter for Disposition on the merits. The hearing officer then concluded that 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4318 permitted the City to keep all of Coker's workers' compensation award without regard for the value of his workfare. Coker once again appealed to the Superior Court (Atwood, J.), which affirmed the hearing officer's decision.
The City challenges the court's determination that the hearing officer had authority to address Coker's appeal. Coker, in turn, challenges the court's judgment affirming the hearing officer's Conclusion that the City may retain all of his workers' compensation award as a recovery of the general assistance it provided to him. Coker argues that the value of work performed by a general assistance recipient pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4316p;A(2)(A) must be offset against the general assistance received, thus limiting the municipality's recovery pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. Section 4318. The City, relying on Radvanovsky v. Maine Dept. of Manpower Affairs, 427 A.2d 961 (Me. 1981) and Closson v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 512 A.2d 1028 (Me. 1986), contends that the work performed has no value other than to establish the recipient's continuing eligibility to receive general assistance.
When the Superior Court reviews a municipal decision pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. Sections 11001-11007 (1989), we review the decision of the municipality directly. See H.E. Sargent, Inc. v. Town of Wells, 676 A.2d 920, 923 (Me. 1996); 5 M.R.S.A. Section 11008 (1989). The hearing officer here was called upon to construe the Municipal General Assistance statutes, specifically 22 M.R.S.A. Sections 4316-A and
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