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Walker v. Walker3/19/1999
ent because the pension was already vested and mature. Hurd 69 Wn. App. at 46. Also at issue in Hurd was a deferred compensation fund that entitled the pensioner to the face value of the fund upon retirement. Hurd, 69 Wn. App. at 43. The court held that the value of this fund should also be calculated assuming immediate retirement because the pensioner could retire at any time; but the court also noted there was no need to adjust for present value because the deferred compensation fund was available as a lump sum. Hurd, 69 Wn. App at 48.
But the facts here are distinguishable from those in Hurd. In Hurd, the pensioner was entitled upon retirement to the face value of the deferred fund. Although the court noted that the pension could be taken as a lump sum or in monthly payments, it is unclear whether a significant monetary disparity existed between the two options. In contrast, John's pension election involves a large financial disparity: He could take the lump sum, $42,966, immediately, or he could elect an annuity of $989.21 per month, which, assuming even a ten-year life span, would have a present value of $82,618.82. See Insurance Commission's mortality tables.
John's pension, a product of his labors during the course of the marriage, was clearly a community asset over which one spouse should not be given unilateral control. Because John had been terminated from his job and his pension had already vested, his pension was fixed. In contrast, the Hurd court was concerned that the pension value decreased as the pensioner delayed his retirement; implicitly, by valuing pensions once they are vested and mature, the court removed a spouse's ability unilaterally to control the value of a community property asset and placed the valuation task properly with the court. See Hurd, 69 Wn. App. at 44, fn3. See also In re Marriage of Gilmore, 629 P.2d. 1, 4 (Cal. 1981).
Here, if the trial court had valued John's pension at its significantly lower lump-sum value rather than its value as an annuity, it would have effectively allowed John to devalue the asset, to Toni's detriment. Nevertheless, John elected to take the asset at its higher annuity value.
Trial courts are mandated to make a just and equitable distribution of assets in a dissolution proceeding. RCW 26.09.080. They are in the best position to take evidence and to determine the value of the assets available for distribution. And while trial courts must value a pension beginning at the date it is vested and mature, the actual value of the asset beyond that point is within the discretion of the court, as long as that valuation is supported by credible evidence. See Worthington, 73 Wn.2d at 764-65; Bradshaw, 43 Wn.2d at 784; Pilant, 42 Wn. App. at 180.
Here, the trial court's valuation of the pension plan is supported by credible evidence. The trial court received into evidence the mortality tables published by the Washington State Insurance Commissioner. John objected to the table as applied to him, but offered no contrary expert medical testimony about the life expectancy of an individual afflicted with Huntington's disease. John himself testified that there was no accurate way to predict when he would need daily assisted care or when his life might terminate because of the disease. John also testified that his mother, who was diagnosed with the disease, lived until the age of 71; his grandmother and his uncle, who may have had the disease, died at ages 70 and 58, respectively. The tables showed John's average life expectancy to be 74 years, a life-span similar to his mother's and grandmother's life-spans.
The trial court noted that there was no evidence calling in
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