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Hatch v. Fred Meyer Inc.3/1/1999
ima facie case. And the sexual nature of the message to her male supervisor supports a reasonable inference that the conduct occurred because she was female.
But Hatch's claim fatally founders on the third element. We hold that the e-mail did not affect the terms and conditions of her employment. Our Supreme Court addressed this element in Glasgow, stating:
Casual, isolated or trivial manifestations of a discriminatory environment do not affect the terms or conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate the law. The harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.{}
Whether the harassment is such that it creates an abusive working environment may be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. We consider the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." "Casual, isolated or trivial" incidents are not actionable.
In support of her claim that the e-mail affected her ability to work at Fred Meyer, Hatch relies on such conclusory statements as "{m}ost reasonable women would be {emotionally distraught}." But conclusory allegations are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary Judgement. Hatch claims that the e-mail was particularly devastating because a manager of a different department sent it to her manager. But Albright, her manager, testified that he immediately understood the e-mail as a vicious prank and responded to it accordingly (by immediately deleting it). Hatch also testified that the e-mail was an isolated incident and that there were no further incidents of harassment. In short, Hatch fails to show by the totality of the circumstances how this isolated incident affected the conditions of her employment.
Because Hatch fails to establish this crucial element of her claim, summary dismissal was proper.
Hatch also contends that the trial court erred by granting the CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the discrimination claims against the individual defendants, Olive and Albright. The basis of the motion was the contention that there is no provision for individual liability under RCW 49.60. Our appellate courts have not yet decided this issue.
Hatch's hostile work environment claim against Olive and Albright as individuals is indistinguishable from her claim against Fred Meyer. Thus, we need not reach the issue of individual liability under RCW 49.60 because we have determined that her discrimination claim is not well founded. Regardless of the basis for the trial court's CR 12(b)(6) ruling, Hatch's failure to establish a cause of action for discrimination presents an alternative ground sufficient to sustain the dismissal of the claim against the individuals. Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy, we conclude that the dismissal of the claims against Albright and Olive was not improper.
III. Defamation
Finally, Hatch claims that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing her defamation claim. The defamation claim arises out of the same offensive e-mail.
A defamation plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) falsity, (2) an unprivileged communication, (3) fault, and (4) damages. For a statement to be defamatory, those who heard it must understand it as defamatory. Although this is normally a question of fact to be resolved by the jury, it may be resolved as a matter of law when reasonable minds could reach but one Conclusion.
On appeal, Hatch appears to p
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