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Hatch v. Fred Meyer Inc.3/1/1999 ils to demonstrate how this issue is material for purposes of the summary Judgement motion.
Hatch testified that she learned she had lost her seniority three days before Fred Meyer offered her the cashier position that incorporated the accommodations specified by her doctor. In declining that offer, Hatch stated that she wished to continue working for Fred Meyer in a different position. It is uncontested that the other position would have presented the same seniority issue. There is no indication in the record that the loss of seniority was a factor in Hatch's decision to decline the cashier position. On this record, we conclude that the seniority issue does not present a genuine issue of material fact to defeat Fred Meyer's motion for summary Judgement on Hatch's disability discrimination claim. Hatch failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning her disability discrimination claim, and Fred Meyer was entitled to Judgement as a matter of law. The trial court's summary dismissal of this claim was proper.
Because we resolve Hatch's disability discrimination claim on these bases, we need not reach the parties' alternative arguments as to this claim.
II. Sexual Harassment
Hatch also contends that the trial court erred by granting the defendants' motion for summary Judgement, dismissing her sexual harassment claim. We reject this claim as well.
Washington's law against discrimination, RCW 49.60, protects employees from sexual harassment. The statute provides, in relevant part, "It is an unfair practice for any employer . . . {t}o discriminate against any person in compensation or in other terms or conditions of employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability." Because our discrimination laws substantially parallel Title VII, this court may look to federal law for non-binding guidance.
Sexual harassment claims are characterized either as "'quid pro quo harassment'" or "'hostile work environment'" claims. The latter type of claim is at issue here. To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim, the employee must demonstrate that there was (1) offensive, unwelcome contact that (2) occurred because of sex or gender, (3) affected the terms or conditions of employment, and (4) can be imputed to the employer.
Hatch's harassment claim is based on one incident that occurred in August 1995. Her supervisor, Ron Albright, received an e-mail that appeared to have been sent from Hatch. It states:
Ran {sic} I have been watching you from afar and I really think we need to get together. I want to meet you in a dark place and rip your pants off and have my way with you . . . . meet me tonight . . . . missing you . . .
Vi.
Albright immediately deleted the message after reading it, considering it a stupid prank by one of Hatch's co-workers. He surmised that someone had seized the chance to create mischief when Hatch had not properly signed off of a computer terminal.
For purposes of the summary Judgement motion, the trial court accepted Hatch's allegation that Olive, the manager of a different department, sent the e-mail. The only two people who saw the e-mail, other than Hatch and the sender, were Albright and his assistant, Sheila Truscan. Both testified that they never thought that Hatch had sent the e-mail.
On appeal, Hatch points solely to this offensive e-mail as evidence of her alleged sexual harassment at work. Because it was offensive and unwelcome, the e-mail satisfies the first and second elements of her pr
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