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Warnek v. Abb Combustion Engineering3/4/1999
to another state's workers' compensation scheme?" We answer the question "No."
"Employment discrimination" may be manifest in many different ways, but in answering this question we limit its application to wrongful discharge.
Plaintiffs have interpreted RCW 51.48.025 to indicate (1) the statute on its face does not specifically require a filing for benefits with the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries in order to come within the protection of the statute; and (2) the language of the statute does not specifically limit "employer" to an employer in the state of Washington.
Plaintiffs' interpretation is not correct. RCW 51.48.025 makes no provision for complaints by employees claiming wrongful discharge based upon their filing for workers' compensation benefits under the laws of another state as asserted by Plaintiffs, although it conceivably would allow complaints by employees claiming wrongful discharge or discrimination because they have filed for workers' compensation benefits in the State of Washington. We are satisfied the wording of the statute evidences a legislative intent not to include in the protected class under RCW 51.48.025 employees who file for workers' compensation benefits in another state.
Plaintiffs are in error in their interpretation of "employer." The word "employers" in RCW 51.48.025 refers only to employers in the State of Washington and does not include employers outside the state.
Plaintiffs cite Marquis v. Spokane and Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co. to support their interpretation of RCW 51.48.025. Those cases are not authority under the facts of this case. The statutes involved in those cases, RCW 49.60.030 and RCW 49.60.010, are codified under chapter 49.60, the "law against discrimination," which, under RCW 49.60.020, provides that the chapter "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of . . . {its} purposes." There is no similar provision in Title 51 RCW. In fact Title 51 RCW by its wording suggests a narrow construction, but this Court has determined it should be liberally construed.
Under the limited facts stated in these certified questions, an employee may not initiate a lawsuit under the wrongful discharge cause of action articulated in Wilmot. Wrongful discharge is generally allowed under four circumstances: "(1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers' compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing."
Even assuming Plaintiffs under the facts of this case have standing to sue under chapter 49.60 RCW, they would at best fall into category (3) (employees fired for exercising a legal right or privilege, such as filing workers' compensation claims). They do not meet the wrongful discharge requirements articulated in Wilmot. Simply stated, Plaintiffs have not been "fired" or "discharged." They are merely former employees who were not rehired. Although Plaintiffs filed for workers' compensation benefits in the State of Colorado during the course of their prior employment by Defendant in that state, they are not current employees who have been fired, nor have they otherwise exercised, or communicated an intent to exercise, a right covered under Title 51 RCW. Discharge during the course of employment and not being rehired for new employment are two distinctly different circumstances. Because Plaintiffs are not current employees, but are former emplo
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