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Baehler v. Fritz Industries Inc.3/24/1999
Amanda Baehler appeals the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of Fritz Industries on her claim of pregnancy discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001, et seq. (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 1999). She brings two points of error, contending that the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment to Fritz because: 1) there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether her pregnancy was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate her employment; and 2) Fritz's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Baehler was unworthy of credence. We overrule her contentions and affirm the summary judgment.
Baehler began working for Fritz in August 1995 as a part-time clerical employee/receptionist. She became a full-time receptionist in September 1995. In March 1996, Baehler accepted the position of safety clerk, a newly-created full-time position. She worked in this position until her termination on January 10, 1997. In addition to her job duties as safety clerk, Baehler continued to perform general office duties, customer service duties, and receptionist duties. Baehler became pregnant in April 1996. Her pregnancy was common knowledge at Fritz by mid-May 1996.
In January 1997, the owner and president of Fritz decided to eliminate positions in the company to reduce costs and to make the operation more efficient. He instructed the office manager, Ellie Henry, to eliminate one office position. Baehler's position was eliminated. Henry believed that the safety clerk position did not warrant a full-time employee and that those duties could be performed by another employee. Henry stated that Baehler's pregnancy "had absolutely no part" in her decision to eliminate the safety clerk position. Baehler was terminated on January 10, 1997. Baehler's safety clerk duties were absorbed by Teresa Peterson, a customer service representative who had been employed with the company since 1980. In addition to Baehler, thirteen other employees were terminated as part of the downsizing.
To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, Fritz was required to prove there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When we review a summary judgment, we accept as true all evidence favoring the non-movant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the non-movant's favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. As the defendant, Fritz was entitled to summary judgment only if it conclusively negated at least one element of Baehler's cause of action or conclusively established all of the elements of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for its ruling, an appellate court will affirm a summary judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).
Baehler filed suit alleging discrimination under Chapter 21 of the Labor Code. Section 21.051 provides that:
"An employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer:"
"(1) fails or refuses to hire an individual, discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; . . . ." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051 (Vernon 1996). Section 21.106 of the Labor Code addresses sex discrimination in relati
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