 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hayes v. Northern Hills General Hospital3/10/1999
ns seeking medical care in the Lead-Deadwood medical community from family practitioners from 1992 to the present" is sufficiently specific so that the parties may be termed "identifiable" under Landstrom when connecting this claim to his already established practice in that same geographical area. 1997 SD 25 at § 75, 561 NW2d at 16. As such, Hayes' claim survives summary judgment. We reverse and remand to the trial court.
[ ] b. Intentional Infliction of emotional distress
[ ] The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the count alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found Hayes failed to provide the material facts to meet two elements of the cause of action, extreme and outrageous conduct and extreme disabling emotional response.
[ ] Hayes claims the trial court erred in the grant of summary judgment on this count. He alleges the defendants, among other things, changed the emergency room policy so he would have to be on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, they mistreated his patients, manipulated his mail, tampered with his patient charts and singled him out for review before the Clinical Monitoring Committee. He alleges that as a result of this conduct he suffered a variety of symptoms. He claims he provided sufficient evidence for both elements to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
[ ] In First Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Bragdon, we first recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 167 NW2d 381 (SD 1969). The essential elements for a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress include:
"(1) an act by defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct;"
"(2) intent on the part of the defendant to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress;"
"(3) the defendant's conduct was the cause in fact of plaintiff's injuries; and"
"(4) the plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to defendant's conduct." Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 NW2d 419, 428 (SD 1994).
[ ] i. Extreme & outrageous conduct
[ ] The defendants claim Hayes failed to meet the first element for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. They argue no reasonable person could construe their actions to be so extreme or outrageous as to permit recovery. Whether the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous is initially an issue for the court. Richardson v. East River Elec. Power Co-Op., 531 NW2d 23, 27 (SD 1995).
[ ] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hayes, placing him on emergency room call 24 hours a day seven days a week, mistreating his patients, manipulation of his mail, tampering with his patient charts and singling him out for review before the Clinical Monitoring Committee could be considered extreme or outrageous. We find Hayes did present sufficient evidence so reasonable minds could differ. Therefore, as to this issue, this is ultimately a factual question for the jury. Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 486 NW2d 516, 519-20 (SD 1992), reh'g granted, Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 491 NW2d 467 (SD 1992).
[ ] Additionally, the defendants claim the alleged acts of outrageous conduct are privileged and cannot form a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Their authority for this proposition consists of a comment from the Restatement 2d of Torts. The comment notes that
"conduct, although it would otherwise be extreme and outrageous, may be privileged under the circumstances. The actor is never liable, for example, where he has done no more than to insist
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 South Dakota Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|