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Hayes v. Northern Hills General Hospital3/10/1999
by written or verbal contract and, whether or not it is in existence, it need not be intended that there be a contract." 45 AmJur2d Interference §50 (1969).
[ ] Our case law establishes the elements for the cause of action to be:
"1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy;"
"2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy;"
"3) an intentional and unjustified act of interference on the part of the interferer;"
"4) proof that the interference cause the harm sustained; and"
"5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted." Case v. Murdock, 1999 SD 22, § 12, ___ NW2d ___, ___. Densmore, 1998 SD 87 at § 24, 583 NW2d at 131. See also Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc., v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 16 IllApp3d 709, 713, 306 NE2d 549, 553 (IllAppCt 1973) rev'd on other grounds, Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc., v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 61 Ill2d 129, 334 NE2d 160 (Ill 1975). The trial court dismissed Hayes' interference with business expectancy count by summary judgment. The court found Hayes could not meet the first element for the cause of action as he presented no material fact showing the existence of a business relationship with a third party. The trial court found that the prospective loss of patients was entirely too speculative as Hayes was depending on unknown and unidentified patients.
[ ] Hayes claims that summary judgment on this count was improper because the court confused the torts of tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with business expectancy. He claims only the tort of interference with contract requires the existence of a contract or relationship with a third party, while the tort of interference with a business expectancy does not. He also alleges the trial court misinterpreted Landstrom to mean the plaintiff must provide the identity of all persons who decided not to see Hayes because of the defendants' actions. Hayes claims there only needs to be an "identifiable" class, not "identified" parties. Finally, Hayes argues that a ruling for the defendants would render this tort a nullity because when a party claimed damage to a business expectancy, he would have to call and depose every person who conceivably could have been a customer to compile a list of "identified" persons.
[ ] We disagree with the trial court's interpretation of Landstrom and "identifiable party" because that approach to the tort will render it a nullity. Based on our reasoning below, we reverse and remand as we find a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue.
[ ] ii. "Identifiable" third party
[ ] "One is liable for commission of this tort who interferes with business relations of another, both existing and prospective, by inducing a third person not to enter into or continue a business relation with another or by preventing a third person from continuing a business relation with another." Northern Plumbing & Heating, Inc., v. Henderson Bros., Inc., 268 NW2d 296, 299 (MichCtApp 1978). We held in Landstrom that to meet the first element there must be a "valid business relationship or expectancy" with a third party. 1997 SD 25 at § 75, 561 NW2d at 16. " here must be a 'triangle'--a plaintiff, an identifiable third party who wished to deal with the plaintiff, and the defendant who interfered with the plaintiff and the third party." Id. (Emphasis added). The principal issue is what is meant by "identifiable" and whether Hayes provided enough evidence of "identifiable" third parties, to present a genuine issue of material fact that would allow him to take this tort claim before a
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