 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Teague-Strebeck Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Insurance Co.3/8/1999
2d 346 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 133, 140, 899 P.2d 576, 583 (1995), stands for the proposition that "Rudel's knowledge or intent at the time of the transaction is not relevant." We acknowledge that some language in Ashlock could be read to support this proposition. We are reluctant, however, to read that decision as eliminating from the Unfair Practices Act the requirement that the false or misleading representation be "knowingly made." Indeed, Ashlock itself states that " our elements must be established to invoke the Unfair Practices Act," and lists the second element as "the false or misleading representation must have been `knowingly made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan of goods or services in the extension of credit or . . . collection of debts.'" Id. at 101, 753 P.2d at 347 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 51-12-2(D)) (ellipsis in Ashlock). Although Ashlock ruled that a statement could violate the statute even though it was not "made with the intent to mislead," id., the opinion did not eliminate the "knowingly" requirement. Moreover, the concern of the Ashlock opinion appears to be bait-and-switch trade practices, see id. at 102, 753 P.2d at 348, which are not at issue in this case.
{69} In addition, an award of treble damages under the Unfair Practices Act is discretionary. NMSA 1978, Section 57-12-10(B) (1987), states that upon finding a willful violation of the act, "the court may award up to three times actual damages." (Emphasis added.) See Ashlock, 107 N.M. at 101, 753 P.2d at 347 (noting this "permissive language"). Hence, even if the district court had been compelled to find a violation of the Unfair Practices Act in this case, it was not required to award any additional damages to Mills-Strebeck. We affirm the district court's denial of the claim under the Unfair Practices Act.
VIII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
{70} The district court denied Mills-Strebeck's claim for punitive damages. Conclusion of Law 36 states: "The evidence does not support a Conclusion that in adjusting this claim that [Chrysler] acted with an evil nature or other culpable mental state; punitive damages are therefore not appropriate."
{71} Mills-Strebeck argues that inasmuch as the district court found that Chrysler had acted in bad faith, an award of punitive damages is mandatory. We disagree. "An award of punitive damages is discretionary." Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 113 N.M. 403, 419, 827 P.2d 118, 134 (1992). "It is generally agreed that punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff and not a matter of right, and that it is always within the discretion of the jury or trial Judge to withhold them." William L. Prosser and W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, at 14 (5th ed. 1984).
{72} To the extent that Mills-Strebeck seeks reversal on the ground that the district court acted under a misconception of the legal standard for awarding punitive damages, we disagree. In Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 118 N.M. 203, 211, 880 P.2d 300, 308 (1994), our Supreme Court wrote:
" o reaffirm that this Court has not lost sight of the limited purpose of punitive damages-to punish and deter persons from conduct manifesting a "culpable mental state"-we now disavow the proposition that in a contract case, including one involving an insurance contract, punitive damages may be predicated solely on gross negligence. In addition to, or in lieu of, such negligence there must be evidence of an "evil motive" or a "culpable mental state.""
As we read Paiz, even when the insured proves bad faith, it must also prove an evil motive or a culp
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 New Mexico Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|