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Hull v. Town of Plymouth & A.3/2/1999
ims against the defendants for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage were not barred.
The defendants argue that by using the words "shall include" in the definition of insurance carrier, the legislature did not exclude other kinds of insurers. They contend that "the plain, common sense meaning of `insurance carrier' is simply any entity providing insurance to the employer."
We interpret statutes according to the plain meaning of the words the legislature used. See South Down Recreation Assoc. v. Moran, 141 N.H. 484, 487, 686 A.2d 314, 316 (1996). We focus "not on isolated words or phrases," but "on the statute as a whole." Id. (quotations omitted). "Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme." Id. (quotation omitted).
In a statutory definition, the word "include" is not generally considered a term of limitation. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction ยง 47.07, at 152 (5th ed. 1992). The term "insurance carrier," however, is used fairly consistently throughout the Workers' Compensation Law to refer specifically to an insurer providing workers' compensation insurance to an employer. See, e.g., RSA 281-A:23, :28, :31. But see RSA 281-A:23, V (using terms "insurer" and "insurance company"), :25 (using term "insurance company"). The use of the term "insurance carrier" in the statute as a whole provides no indication that it was intended to apply to carriers of other types of insurance except, perhaps, when those insurers are required by the statute to also provide compensation coverage as part of their policies. See RSA 281-A:6. Thus, a plain reading of the statute supports the plaintiffs' interpretation.
Even though we hold that the statute is clear on its face, the defendants contend that this interpretation is contrary to the legislative history behind RSA 281-A:8. In 1961, the legislature explicitly granted the employer's insurance carrier immunity by amending the statutory predecessor to RSA 281-A:8. See Thone v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 130 N.H. 702, 706, 549 A.2d 778, 781 (1988) (discussing amendment of RSA 281:12 (repealed 1988)); Laws 1988, 194:1, I (noting that "RSA 281-A is a reenactment of the substance of RSA 281"). The Senate Journal states that the amendment " larifies the original intent of the law to provide, that for the purposes of employer liability, the employer and the employer's insurance carrier are one and the same." N.H.S. Journal 636-37 (1961). The 1961 amendment was a direct response to our decision in Smith v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960), that an employee could bring a claim against the employer's workers' compensation carrier for negligent inspection. See Thone, 130 N.H. at 706, 549 A.2d at 781. We revisited the question of the carrier's independent tort liability in Thone, where the plaintiffs claimed that the workers' compensation insurer failed to properly inspect the workplace, and thus caused an explosion that killed several employees. We held in Thone that RSA 281-A:8 was a permissible bar to the negligence action brought against the employer's workers' compensation carrier. See id. at 706-07, 549 A.2d at 781.
The legislative history suggests that the amendment to RSA 281-A:8 was intended to protect the workers' compensation carrier from independent tort liability for employees' work-related injuries. The foregoing does not persuade us that RSA 281-A:8 indiscriminately immunizes the employer's various other insurance carriers from employee claims and actions. Thus, for instance, while the employer's immunity normally insulates its third party liability
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