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Werner v. Little3/23/1999
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
Affirmed as modified
Relator Lawrence Werner contends the administrative law Judge (ALJ) erred by finding relator violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and by awarding damages to respondent, Teresa Little, plus penalties, litigation costs, and attorney fees. Relator argues that substantial evidence does not support either the determination that he discriminated against respondent or the award of punitive damages and attorney fees. We affirm as modified.
DECISION
Our review in this case is governed by Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (1998), which allows this court to affirm, remand, reverse, or modify an agency decision if the "substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced" because the administrative Conclusions are unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Under the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court "will affirm the agency's decision if, in considering the entire record, it is supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate." Minneapolis Police Dep't v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 425 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn. 1988). Although a reviewing court may reach a contrary Conclusion to that arrived at by an administrative body, the court "cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body when the finding is properly supported by the evidence." Vicker v. Starkey, 265 Minn. 464, 470, 122 N.W.2d 169, 173 (1963).
I.
Relator contends that some of the evidence considered at the administrative hearing concerned events that occurred after the statute of limitations had run for an MHRA action. Because appellant did not raise this issue at the hearing, we will not consider it on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (reviewing court will generally only consider matters presented and considered by district court).
Relator also complains that significant evidence presented was based on hearsay, and therefore may not be used to support an award. We disagree. An ALJ may admit all evidence that possesses probative value, including hearsay, if it is the type of evidence on which reasonable, prudent persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of their serious affairs. Lee v. Lee, 459 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Minn. App. 1990). Because the hearsay at issue meets this test, we conclude the ALJ did not err.
Relator contends the testimony of respondent's witness, a tenant of the same apartment building, was irrelevant and therefore should not have been considered by the ALJ. We disagree. Under federal law, evidence showing harassment of other women is directly relevant to the question of whether a hostile environment was created. See Vinson v. Talyor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing evidentiary ruling that disallowed the testimony of other women's experiences in a Title VII, employment law context because such testimony could help establish that there was a hostile work environment). Moreover, in Kay v. Peter Motor Co., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. App. 1992), a hostile work environment case, this court allowed co-worker testimony because it was offered to demonstrate the employer's intent to make harassing comments, his knowledge of the offensive nature of his remarks, the hostile working environment he created by making such remarks, and his motive in making the remarks. Because the testimony of the cotenant was also relevant in determining whether there was a hostile environment, we conclude the ALJ did not err by considering the testimony.
Appellant's remaining compl
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