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Washington v. Entergy Corp.3/3/1999
WASHINGTON v. ENTERGY CORP., 98-1953 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99);
Court composed of Chief Judge ROBERT J. KLEES, Judge MOON LANDRIEU and Judge PATRICIA RIVET MURRAY.
Defendants, Entergy Corporation and Gulf States Utilities Company, seek reversal of a judgment overruling their declinatory exception of improper venue. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Clarence Washington, a resident of East Baton Rouge Parish, filed this employment discrimination suit in Orleans Parish Civil District Court on November 17, 1997. His petition asserts that he was employed in the defendant's Baton Rouge offices since 1968, but he had been forced to file for early retirement benefits in December 1996 due to a pattern of discriminatory conduct that began in January 1995. Mr. Washington claims he is entitled to damages, attorney fees and court costs under Louisiana's statutes prohibiting discrimination based upon race and age.
Entergy responded with this exception, asserting that venue is improper in Orleans Parish because all of the allegedly wrongful conduct, including the decision that led to termination of Mr. Washington's employment, occurred in East Baton Rouge Parish. It contended that because the new Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law became effective before Mr. Washington filed this suit, venue is proper only in East Baton Rouge Parish under R.S. § 23:313 (governing the age discrimination claim) and § 23:333 A (discrimination based upon race or color).
Both of these statutes state, in pertinent part:
"A plaintiff who has a cause of action against an employer . . . for a violation of this Part may file a suit in the district court for the parish in which the alleged violation occurred. . . ."
Entergy argued that under this wording, a plaintiff may or may not file a suit for damages, but if a claim is asserted, it can only be filed where the alleged violation occurred.
In opposition to Entergy's exception, Mr. Washington established that each of the named defendants is a licensed foreign corporation that designated a New Orleans address as its principal business establishment in the state, so that venue is proper under Article 42(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. He argued that the newly enacted statutes cited by Entergy, which use the permissive "may" rather than the mandatory "shall," merely permit an additional venue to that provided for in Article 42(4). In addition, MI. Washington maintained that he was wrongfully discharged in New Orleans, where the decision to terminate him was made, because New Orleans was given as the employer's location on his "pink slip" at termination, and his notice concerning retirement eligibility came from the same address. He also emphasized the allegations in his petition specifying that Entergy's company-wide discriminatory policies and practices were initiated and effectuated by those in the New Orleans "Corporate Executive Office." He argued, therefore, that, even were the statutes interpreted as Entergy suggested, his suit was properly filed in Orleans Parish where "the alleged violation occurred," at least in part.
The trial court overruled Entergy's exception, after considering the evidence and arguments, holding that §§ 23:313 and 333 A are not exclusive mandatory venue provisions, but instead supplement the general rules in Article 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the court found that Orleans Parish, the location of defendant's principal place of business, was a proper venue. The court did not reach the question of where "the alleged violation occurred."
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
"The function of statuto
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