 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Waters v. Glynn County3/16/1999
*PLEASE NOTE: THIS IS A SUBSTITUTE OPINION.
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
123P-122
Larry Waters was terminated from his position as a department head in Glynn County after he was accused of rape and creating a hostile work environment by another Glynn County employee. Although the county administrator originally gave Waters the option of taking a reassignment in lieu of termination, the Glynn County commission subsequently discharged him. Waters sued the county, seeking lost wages and equitable relief, claiming that his termination had violated due process. While the trial court found that no due process violation had occurred, it held Waters' termination was unauthorized because the applicable county ordinance vested the county administrator, and not the commission, with the authority to discharge Waters. Accordingly, the trial court found that Waters was entitled to exercise the option granted by the county administrator. When Waters opted to take the reassignment, the trial court entered an order directing the county to give Waters another position in county government.
In an earlier appeal in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Waters' termination was illegal. Glynn County v. Waters, 268 Ga. 500, 502-3 (2, 3) (491 SE2d 370) (1997). In reaching this Conclusion, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that as a department head, Waters was expressly excluded from Glynn County's personnel ordinance and was thus an at-will employee, whose employment was subject to termination by the county administrator. Id. at 502 (2). And because the county commission's termination of Waters was unauthorized, the Supreme Court agreed that Waters was entitled to the equitable relief granted by the trial court. Id. at 503 (3). Further, while the decision confirmed that the county had no sovereign immunity defense to Waters' claim for equitable relief, it reserved decision on whether the county had immunity from the claim for back pay, as the trial court had not yet addressed the issue. Id. at 503 (4).
After the Supreme Court's decision, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issues of back pay and attorney's fees. The trial court found that Waters' claim for back pay was barred by sovereign immunity, but held that the claim for attorney's fees was not. The parties have filed cross-appeals, and we affirm.
Case No. A98A2256
1. Waters argues that the trial court erred in holding that his claim for back pay is barred by sovereign immunity because his claim arises out of his employment contract with Glynn County, and sovereign immunity has been waived as to contract actions against the county under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (c) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution.
"In 1991, the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity was amended to extend sovereign immunity 'to the state and all of its departments and agencies,' and this immunity is to prevail except as specifically provided therein. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(e)." Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 746 (1) (452 SE2d 476)(1994). The phrase "the state and its department and agencies" has long been interpreted to include counties within the ambit of sovereign immunity. Id. at 747 (2); Miller v. Georgia Ports Auth., 266 Ga. 586, 588-89 (470 SE2d 426)(1996).
The Georgia Constitution also provides that sovereign immunity is waived "as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract now existing or hereafter entered into by the state or its department or agencies." Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(c). Thus, the defense of sovereign immunity has be
Page 1 2 3 Georgia Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|