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Dike v. State11/30/1999
standard for construing statutes. We attempt to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature=s intent. State Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We begin by making an A>inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.=@ Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe statutes as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statutes on the same subject. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers= Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1997); Pacificorp, 872 P.2d at 1166. We give effect to the plain language of unambiguous statutes. Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers= Compensation, 957 P.2d 843, 846 (Wyo. 1998). We resort to extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history or intent, only when statutes are ambiguous. Christensen v. Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1995).
In making the determination of whether this statute is clear and unambiguous, we must analyze the structure and position of the words in the statute, applying rules of common grammatical principles. A>This Court naturally does not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; but neither do we regard ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant to a construction of those enactments.=@ Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843-44 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960)).
After analyzing ' 6-1-104(a)(iv), we conclude that the language is clear and unambiguous. The phrase Awhich in the manner it is used@ modifies only the last antecedent, Aother device, instrument, material or substance.@ A ther device@ is preceded by an Aor,@ and, generally, where no contrary intention appears, relative and qualifying words and phrases are construed to refer solely to the last antecedent with which they are closely connected.
Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Authority of City of Boulder, 490 P.2d 299, 301-02 (Colo. 1971) (en banc).
The aggravated assault statute enhances the punishment if the defendant uses a deadly weapon because deadly weapons cause a greater degree of fear in the person being assaulted. The victim does not know that the firearm is not loaded, and his apprehension and consequent reactions will be the same as if the firearm were loaded. He may try to escape or defend himself, conceivably putting himself and others into a precarious and dangerous situation. Id; see generally Sindelar v. State, 932 P.2d 730, 733 (Wyo. 1997); ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 310-11 (Wyo. 1992) (recognizing the danger created when an unloaded firearm is pointed at an individual).
We hold that the Adeadly weapon@ definition includes unloaded firearms. It necessarily follows that an assault with an unloaded gun is elevated to the offense of aggravated assault. This is consistent with the cases where we held that unloaded firearms are deadly weapons for the purposes of the aggravated burglary statute. Britt v. State, 734 P.2d 980, 981 (Wyo. 1987); Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Wyo. 1997).
B. Instruction
Dike also claims that the trial court denied him his due process right to a fair trial by instructing the jury that a firearm is a deadly weapon. He maintains that the jury should have been permitted to make the determination of whether an unloaded gun qualifies as a deadly weapon.
The trial court is given wide latitude in i
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