McCormick v. Lake Washington School District12/6/1999
d, argues that no permanent employment existed. The District contends that permanent employment is a function of the District's Board of Directors (Board) and requires a written contract. RCW 28A.405.210. Because no written contract exists and the Board never acted, the District argues that there is no issue of material fact to address.
McCormick claims that Anderson made a verbal offer of employment. She relies on Schoonover v. Carpet World, Inc., 91 Wn.2d 173, 588 P.2d 729 (1978), in arguing that the District's agent, Anderson, had apparent authority to bind the District. In Schoonover, the plaintiff claimed that defendant Carpet World's employee, Rodriguez, had apparent authority to bind the defendant to an employment contract. Rodriguez was the only permanently assigned salesman to the Lynwood Carpet World. Rodriguez hired the plaintiff for an hourly salary plus sales commission. The defendant's president and sales manager had knowledge of plaintiff's employment at the store, and a number of sales invoices that bore plaintiff's signature as "representative" were sent from the outlet to the corporate office. The Court held that the defendant's actions clothed its agent, Rodriguez, with apparent authority to hire and bind the defendant to the terms of the employment contract. Schoonover, 91 Wn.2d at 179-80.
As a matter of law, Anderson could not have apparent authority. Permanent employment contracts for public schools are governed by statute. The governing statute rests hiring authority on the Board:
No teacher, . . ., hereinafter referred to as "employee," shall be employed except by written order of a majority of the directors of the district at a regular or special meeting thereof . . . .
The {B}oard shall make with each employee employed by it a written contract, which shall be in conformity with the laws of the state, and except as otherwise provided for by law, limited to a term of not more than one year. Every such contract shall be made in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the school district superintendent or secretary and one copy to be delivered to the employee. RCW 28A.405.210.
A Board may not divest itself of specific functions delegated by statute. Lake Washington Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Lake Washington Educ. Ass'n, 109 Wn.2d 427, 431-32, 745 P.2d 504 (1987) (citing Noe, v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15 of Snohomish County, 83 Wn.2d 97, 103, 515 P.2d 977 (1973)). The power to hire is a non-delegable prerogative of the Board. Lake Washington, 109 Wn.2d at 431-32.
Unilateral action by the agent does not bind the principal. Smith v. Hansen, Hansen & Johnson, Inc., 63 Wn. App. 355, 362-66, 818 P.2d 1127 (1991). Apparent authority is not inferred from the agent's actions: "{a}n agent's apparent authority to bind a principal depends upon the objective manifestations of the principal to a third person." State v. French, 88 Wn. App. 586, 595, 945 P.2d 752 (1997) (citing King v. Riveland, 125 Wn.2d 500, 507, 886 P.2d 160 (1994)). The principal must have knowledge of the act committed by its agent. French, 88 Wn. App. at 595, (citing State v. Parada, 75 Wn. App. 224, 231, 877 P.2d 231 (1994)). The principal may also be bound by the agent's actions if he places the agent in a position that persons of "ordinary prudence, reasonably conversant with business usages and customs, are thereby led to believe and assume that the agent is possessed of certain authority, and to deal with him in reliance of such assumption." Schoonover 91 Wn.2d at 177 (citing Lumber Mart Co. v. Buchanan, 69 Wn.2d 658, 662, 419 P.2d 1002 (1966)).
The facts here are distinguished from Schoonover where there was no statute that governed employment. H
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