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Raymond v. Pacific Chemical12/13/1999
In the instant case, even if the restrictive covenant were invalid, Pacific Chemical's good faith assertion of its legal interests would not constitute improper interference. See Leingang, 131 Wn.2d at 157; see also Dauphin v. Smith, 42 Wn. App. 491, 495, 713 P.2d 116 (1986). Absent any evidence that the company attempted to enforce the covenant in bad faith, Pacific Chemical's assertion of a legally protected interest does not constitute tortious interference. See Leingang, 131 Wn.2d at 157. Although the Raymonds alleged that Pacific Chemical improperly terminated Terry's employment on the basis of his age, they voluntarily nonsuited that claim before they filed this appeal. Thus, no cause of action remains in this suit to support the claim of tortious interference. We conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing the claim.
Age Discrimination Claim
The Raymonds also argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their age discrimination claims against Terry Raymond's supervisors and managers. The individual defendants respond that this claim is moot because the Raymonds voluntarily nonsuited their age discrimination claim against Pacific Chemical, contending that any ruling on the issue of individual liability for the claims would be advisory and inappropriate. The Raymonds' claim against the individual defendants, however, is not based on the liability of Pacific Chemical for any of the allegedly discriminatory acts. Rather, the Raymonds argue that the state law against discrimination provides an independent cause of action against individual supervisors and managers who commit age discrimination. This claim does not depend upon the presence of claims against Pacific Chemical. Thus, we find that the issue is not moot.
Washington's law against discrimination, RCW 49.60, recognizes the right of citizens to be free from various forms of discrimination and establishes a state agency to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment, credit and insurance transactions, public accommodation, and real property transactions. RCW 49.60.010, -.030(1); see Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, 116 Wn.2d 659, 673, 807 P.2d 830 (1991). It also creates a private cause of action to address discriminatory conduct.
Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, or the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.). RCW 49.60.030(2).
The act defines unfair employer practices to include discrimination in hiring, discharge, compensation, and other terms or conditions of employment. RCW 49.60.180. Under the act, "employer" is defined as "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons" excluding any religious or sectarian organization that is not organized for private profit. RCW 49.60.040(3).
In Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wn.2d 58, 922 P.2d 788 (1996), the court held that an employee could not maintain sexual harassment and retaliation claims against her employer under RCW 49.60 because she was the only full- time employee. The court concluded that the definition of an employer in RCW 49.60.040(3) exempted small employers from civil liability under the act. Griffin, 130 Wn.2d at 63-64; accord Anaya v. Graham, 89 Wn. App. 588, 950 P
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