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Snyder v. Medical Service Corporation of Eastern Washington12/2/1999
s. On February 13, Ms. Snyder took two weeks off on the advice of her physician. On February 26, Ms. Snyder's physician informed MSC that she should be off work for two more weeks due to anxiety.
On March 11, Ms. Snyder met with Ms. Hall's supervisor, Dr. Norman Charney, and reported that she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Ms. Snyder has struggled with depression her entire life. She was first diagnosed with PTSD in 1987 or 1988. She has also taken anti- depressants since 1988 and received regular psychological counseling since 1986. This was MSC's first notice of Ms. Snyder's emotional problems.
Ms. Snyder refused to return to work under Ms. Hall's supervision. Dr. Charney told Ms. Snyder that he wanted her to return to MSC, but that she would report to Ms. Hall.
On April 10, another company offered Ms. Snyder full-time employment if her physician released her for work. Her physician released her to work in any position and without restriction. But Ms. Snyder's physician did not release her to return to work under Ms. Hall's supervision.
Ms. Snyder left MSC because she could not work with Ms. Hall.
She then sued MSC for infliction of emotional distress (both intentional and negligent), constructive discharge, and handicap discrimination. She based the claims on Ms. Hall's "continuing harassment," her "rude, discourteous, disruptive, threatening, intimidating and coercing" conduct between April 1996 and February 1997, and MSC's failure to do anything about it.
The trial court granted MSC's motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review. Review of a summary judgment is de novo. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). We look for a genuine issue of material fact. In doing so, we consider the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to Ms. Snyder. Id. And we will affirm the dismissal of a complaint if the facts do not support a cause of action. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wn.2d 97, 105, 922 P.2d 43 (1996).
Employer Immunity.
We begin by noting Ms. Snyder's claim is not barred by Washington's Industrial Insurance Act, which precludes civil suits by workers for injuries or occupational diseases incurred in the course of employment. McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 110 Wn.2d 812, 815-16, 759 P.2d 351 (1988). The claim is not based on an injury as defined by the Act (a sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature). RCW 51.08.100; Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wn. App. 552, 566, 829 P.2d 196 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 124 Wn.2d 634, 880 P.2d 29 (1994). Neither is it an occupational injury. WAC 296-14-300 (claims based on mental conditions or mental disabilities caused by stress, including stress caused by conflicts or relationships with supervisors, fall outside the definition of an occupational disease).
Outrage.
The tort of outrage, also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress, requires: "'(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress; and (3) actual result to the plaintiff of severe emotional distress.'" Birklid v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d 853, 867, 904 P.2d 278 (1995) (quoting Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wn.2d 48, 61, 742 P.2d 1230 (1987)); Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 46 (1965). The conduct must be "'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Dombrosky v. Farmers Ins. Co., 84 Wn. App. 245, 261, 928 P.2d 1127 (1996) (quotin
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