 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Greene v. Seattle City Light12/20/1999
ima facie case of racial discrimination for disparate treatment, an employee must show that "(1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was treated less favorably in the terms or conditions of his employment (3) than a similarly situated, non-protected employee, and (4) he and the non-protected 'comparator' were doing substantially the same work."
If the employee establishes these elements of the prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The burden then shifts again to the employee, who must produce evidence indicating that the reason is unworthy of belief or a pretext for a discriminatory purpose. One test of pretext is whether an employee outside the protected class committed acts of comparable seriousness but was not similarly disciplined.
The question of an employer's intent to discriminate is a question of fact. Thus, summary judgment is generally inappropriate, even when the employer proffers a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the disciplinary action, thereby shifting the burden to the employee to prove that the articulated reason is a pretext. In cases of racial discrimination, the key issue is whether the race was a substantial factor in the employer's disciplinary decision. At the summary judgment stage, the employee is required to show only "that a reasonable trier of fact could, but not necessarily would, draw the inference that {race} was a substantial factor in the decision."
Greene has stated a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The first element is met because as an African-American, Greene belongs to a protected class. The remaining elements are also met: Greene alleged that he was disciplined more harshly than a similarly situated, non-protected employee, and that he and the non-protected 'comparator' were doing substantially the same work. Specifically, Greene pointed to a non-protected crew chief, Barry Kaiser, who had the same number of safety violations in roughly the same time period as had Greene. Yet, Kaiser was not demoted and appears to have received only a verbal reprimand. City Light contends it demoted Greene because of his safety violations. And it distinguishes the comparator and Greene on the basis of the factual differences of their respective safety violations. But this explanation that Kaiser is not a comparator necessarily creates a genuine issue of material fact. At oral argument, City Light argued that its explanation does not create an issue of disputed fact because Greene failed below to rebut the explanation. But we are unaware of any authority supporting such a proposition. Here, Greene established a prima facie case of racial discrimination due to disparate treatment. Under the burden-shifting framework of this cause of action, City Light was required to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The burden would then shift to Greene to produce evidence that the reason is pretextual. But instead of establishing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Greene's demotion, City Light contended that factual differences prove that Kaiser was not a comparator.
Greene has presented evidence that an employee outside the protected class committed acts of comparable seriousness but was not similarly disciplined. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists about whether City Light's stated reasons for demoting Greene were merely pretextual. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court's order dismissing Greene's racial discrimination claim.
Retaliation
Greene claims that he established a prima facie case of retaliation that precluded summary judgment. We agree.
C
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Washington Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|